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Abstract

Fiscal Decentralization: does the Source of Revenue Matter?
Evidence from Rural India

Pallavi Jain Govil

Adviser: Professor Timothy J. Goodspeed

Is the pattern of expenditures of village governments related to their sources of revenue? Do
village governments use own-source revenues more efficiently than transfer grants to provide
public services to their constituents?
This paper begins with the premise that local governments are more participative, more
acceptable, and more accountable and hence, deliver better. I use a policy change introduced in
1997 in province of Madhya Pradesh in India, whereby the power to collect royalty and lease
rents on minor mineral mines and fishing tanks was transferred to village governments, as a
natural experiment and examine whether expenditure patterns of villages that received such
resources differ from those that did not. I find that village governments choose to spend their
fiscal resources differently depending on where the money comes from, even if these resources
are completely ‘untied’ and could be spent entirely at the discretion of the village governments.
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I also compare the social outcomes in villages that gained such additional resources to those
that didn’t, and thus remained more dependent on transfer grants from the state and central
government for their development needs. Using village level data, I find evidence to support the
hypothesis that fiscal decentralization through assignment of taxation powers is more effective in
achieving desired outcomes as compared to a transfer of an equal amount of resources by way of
grants.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The main objective of decentralization, political and fiscal, in a democracy is the
maximization of public welfare. In theory, welfare maximization would happen because local
governments would be better attuned to judge local and regional aspirations and make suitable
decisions accordingly. A higher level of participation in local governance would entail a more
efficient and wider tax collection network that would make it easier to fund development
expenditure. Local government would ideally be more participative, more acceptable and more
accountable. Local government would therefore, deliver better.
“First generation models” on local government finance and ‘fiscal federalism’ (Oates, 1972;
Tiebout, 1956) come to the conclusion that empowering local governments helps in improving
efficiency in the delivery of public services. Increasing fiscal autonomy implies a better
alignment between spending and funding responsibilities and a potential improvement of both
the efficiency and the effectiveness of public services provided to citizens.
Another strand of modern theoretical literature on fiscal federalism has focused on the
importance of electoral accountability of incumbent politicians (Besley and Case, 1995, Boetti et
al, 2009 etc). This literature emphasizes that pure economic models of policy choice are not
1

sufficient to determine how economic policy options are exercised by politicians. Political
economy considerations also exert a significant influence on policy choices.
Decentralization may not have an unambiguously positive impact on governance and the
economy. A substantial body of economic literature has also dwelt on potentially negative
impacts of decentralization. The duplication of administrative costs by various tiers of
government, lack of administrative capacity and/or fiscal irresponsibility on the part of the lower
tiers of governments, especially when erring local governments can avail bailouts from central
governments (Goodspeed, 2002), and corruption and capture of local governments by local
elites, are possibilities that have been examined in economic literature, which might result in
sub-optimal outcomes.
There is also emerging literature that examines the impact of fiscal and political
decentralization on social capital and the importance of building institutions capable of
governance at sub-national levels. This strand of literature compares ‘closer’ to ‘distant’
governments (de Mello (2000), (2010), and Ligthart and Oudheusden (2011)) and examines the
decision making process in more participative governance structures. This research proposes that
the impact of fiscal decentralization must be looked at more holistically, by also gauging the
impacts on social capital and trust in government, and not only allocative efficiency.
In the last few decades, local governments all over the world have emerged as major players
in developmental efforts. In many countries, political decentralization has been carried out in
varying degrees, followed by fiscal decentralization. India adopted a federal structure at the time
of its independence in 1947, with substantial political and fiscal powers being shared between
the center and the states. However, the transfer of powers to lower levels of government, that is
2

municipal governments and village governments if fairly recent, as it began primarily after the
enactment of the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Constitution in 1992. Estimating the impact of
decentralization is very relevant for a developing country like India, since decentralization is
seen as an operational strategy for poverty alleviation and economic development.
However, empirical evidence that links public expenditures to public outcomes at the local
level, especially in developing countries, is still limited. Much of economic literature that has
examined the impacts of fiscal decentralization has used data from the IMF’s Government
Finance Statistics (GFS), for example, Ebel and Yilmatz, 2002, Treisman, 2002, de Mello, 2000,
Mc Nab et al, 2005 etc. A major limitation of this data, as pointed out by Barankay and
Lockwood (2006), is that it does not provide a good measure of the true autonomy of subnational governments; neither does it estimate government production functions. Further, while
there is data available for taxation, expenditures, and social and economic outcomes at provincial
levels for most countries, there is very limited data available for local governments at the village
level, and at the district (county) levels.
In such a scenario, this study which uses village level data for over 10,000 villages,
collected by a state government in India for the State Finance Commission – which is mandated
to gauge the state of local finances and to make recommendations on sharing of revenues
between the state and local governments – assumes significance, since this is the first such study
which uses such extensive data from local governments in the state to examine their
performance. To the best of my knowledge, this is also the first such comprehensive study in
India.
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In this paper I draw upon a fiscal dataset relating to panchayats1 in the State of Madhya
Pradesh (M.P)2. Information about a ‘natural experiment’ through which some tax resources
were allocated to some panchayats is used to get a better insight into the issues related to fiscal
decentralization. I first investigate whether the structure of the revenue-base of a panchayat has
implications on the structure or pattern of its expenditures. Later, I also seek to answer the
question whether village governments use own-source revenues more efficiently than transfer
grants to provide public services to their constituents?
The paper is organized as follows: chapter two contains a review of literature on fiscal
decentralization in theory, as well as empirical investigations into the various aspects of
decentralization, both fiscal and political. Chapter three gives a broad overview of Indian polity
and the history of decentralization in the country. It also contains a summary of the
decentralization experience of M.P., presents a brief overview of the finances of panchayats in
the state, and describes the main recommendations of the Central and State Finance
Commissions. It contains a brief description of the status of human development in the state,
especially with regard to female literacy.
Chapter four investigates the relationship between the structure of revenue-base and the
expenditure pattern, and presents the result that a change in the proportion of own-source
revenues is associated with a change in expenditure priorities.

1 Local self-government at the village, block and district level. This system of local self-government in rural areas is
called ‘Panchayati Raj’ or Rule of the Panchayats. ‘Panch’ means five, thus, literally translated, ‘Panchayat’ means a
body of five persons.
2 A state in Central India

4

Chapter five lays out the theoretical model for testing social impacts of fiscal
decentralization. I show that empirically tax assignment is more efficient 3 than transfer grants.
The use of a natural experiment (assignment of revenues from tanks and minerals to panchayats)
demonstrates that fiscal decentralization by tax assignment is more efficient than fiscal
decentralization by transfer grants. Chapter seven concludes.

3

“Efficiency” is measured here in terms of the outcomes achieved per Rupee earned by the panchayat, through any
of the two different modes of revenue decentralization: transfer grants, or assignment of the tax base.
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Chapter 2
Fiscal Decentralization and Development: A literature
review

2.1 Fiscal Federalism: Economic Theory
Economic theory on local government finance and ‘fiscal federalism’ (Oates, 1972; Tiebout,
1956) has traditionally concluded that empowering local governments helps in improvement of
efficiency in the delivery of public services. Oates’s (2005) “First Generation Theory of Fiscal
Federalism” envisages a central government which provides grants to decentralized
governments. The recipient governments pursue the objective of maximizing local welfare and
produce local public goods to the point where marginal social benefits for the society as a whole
equal marginal costs. This body of literature considers issues of tax-assignment and of
equalizing, lump-sum grants from the central government to regional or local governments. It
also recognizes the role of local taxation in establishing a proper environment for budgetary
decision-making.
The ‘second generation theory’, on the other hand, deals with modeling of political
institutions and their incentive systems, and problems of information asymmetry. Governments
are assumed to maximize their own objective functions, which need not necessarily mean, the
6

maximization of public welfare (for example, Lockwood (2007), Besley and Coate (2003)).
Another stream of literature studies the trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision
in principal agent models of electoral accountability4. Here, the electorate are the principals and
the politicians are the agents and the main reason why government performance is inefficient, is
the presence of asymmetric information between them (Seabright (1996), Oates (2005)).
Hayek (1948) remarked that it was only by decentralization that we could ensure the
knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place will be promptly used. Thus, in order to
rapidly adapt to changes the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who have familiarity
with the ‘circumstances’ and have direct and immediate knowledge of the resources available to
meet these challenges.
While the common argument for decentralization is that mobile factors will lead to
competition between governments and efficient supply of public goods shall follow, yet if the
mobility is too high, local governments may not be able to collect sufficient tax revenues for
provision of basic public goods. Another argument relating to the demerits of decentralization is
that multi-tier governments are likely to waste resources through duplication of administrative
costs. Furthermore, if local governments are more susceptible to corruption and capture by the
elite, then again outcomes shall be suboptimal from the point of view of the society. The limited
administrative capacity of the local representatives and officials can also lead to bad governance.
Breton (2002), for example, argues that decentralization failures arise because of the
incapacity of intergovernmental competition to produce the most ‘desirable’ outcomes.
According to this paper there are four factors that may cause competition to break down:

4

A brief literature review on Fiscal decentralization and efficiency is contained in Porcelli (2009).
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potentially higher information costs, higher coordination costs for subnational governments,
inability of the subnational governments to benefit from diminishing supply costs (economies of
scale), and dynamic instability (‘race to the bottom’ policies in taxation).
In the last few decades, local governments all over the world have emerged as major players
in development efforts. Political decentralization has been carried out in varying degrees,
followed by fiscal decentralization. However, empirical evidence that links public expenditures
to public outcomes at the local level, especially in developing countries, is still limited.

2.2 Cross-Country Evidence on Impact of Fiscal Decentralization
A USAID report (2006) surveys the existing literature on fiscal decentralization and on
decentralization of public service delivery and its impact on poverty reduction. It points out that
most of the work that deals with fiscal decentralization and its impact on poverty reduction
suffers from lack of empirical evidence to support the positions taken.
Policy makers commonly hold that effective delivery of public services is an essential
ingredient in their efforts to reduce poverty. The strand of literature that believes in the positive
impact of decentralization on delivery of public services, and thus on poverty reduction ascribes
this belief to the following reasons:
i.

regional differences in needs and preferences can be better taken into account,

ii.

population mobility narrows the gap between local government policy and local
communities’ preferences,

iii.

competition among local governments favors efficiency and organizational and political
innovations, and

iv.

governance is more efficient and responsive as citizens have more influence.
8

The report also lists a number of institutional factors that may affect the outcomes of
decentralization. These are:
a.

the accountability of sub-national governments to constituents,

b. the possibility for people to choose where to reside,
c. level of civic participation and social capital,
d. the degree of independence of the local government from the higher levels of
government,
e. availability of qualified personnel at the local level, and
f. a minimum of fiscal management and budgeting institutions.
Fiscal decentralization affects poverty reduction by ensuring that public expenditures are
more effective, which also depends on how these expenditures are financed. Raising revenues
locally has the potential benefits of enhancing the accountability of sub-national governments to
their constituencies, increasing the awareness of local taxpayers about taxes, and improving their
participation in ensuring higher quality of delivery of local services.
Wallack and Srinivasan (2006) present an overview of the division of responsibilities and
powers across sub-national governments in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India,
Mexico and Nigeria. They find a common tendency towards centralization of control over most
of the revenue base and over-expenditures in return for various promises of grants to subnational governments, and that the need for negotiations between central and lower levels of
government for control over revenues and bail-outs impedes economic reforms.

9

Estache and Sinha (1995) estimate the net impact of decentralization on total and
subnational infrastructure expenditures in two samples: one including ten industrialized
countries, and the other including ten developing countries. This study finds a significant
positive impact of expenditure decentralization on per capita expenditure deliveries. The impact
is stronger in developing countries and weaker when local governments rely more on central
funds rather their own revenues.
De Mello and Barenstein (2001) use cross-country data for 78 countries and examine the
association of fiscal decentralization with various indicators of governance, such as corruption,
rule of law, and government effectiveness. They show that the relationship between
decentralization and governance depends on how sub-national expenditures are financed. They
argue that the impact of subnational revenue mobilization on governance depends on the
country’s level of decentralization. In particular, subnational revenue mobilization is associated
with improved governance for those countries with smaller subnational governments, which
comprise most of the developing countries in the sample taken in this paper. The turning point
for the decentralization indicator (share of subnational spending in total government expenditure)
seems to be around 19 percent. The authors find that governance deteriorates when further
subnational revenue mobilization is pursued in the course of decentralization in countries where
subnational governments already account for more than 19 percent of total government spending.
Expenditure decentralization also remains positively associated with governance, unless local
revenue mobilization is extremely high (at 87 percent or higher).

10

Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) use data from OECD5 for eleven transition countries for the years
2001 and 2002 which identifies three sources of sub national revenues – tax revenues, nontax
revenues, and intergovernmental grants. They replicate studies which have used IMF’s GFS data
to examine the implications regarding budget balance, economic growth and public sector size
for these countries. They show that cross-country studies which are based on GFS data (which
describes the degree of fiscal decentralization as the sub national share of total government
spending / revenue or of Gross Domestic Product) misrepresent the degree of fiscal
decentralization in transition countries.
The authors define tax autonomy as the ratio of own taxes to sub national revenues and find
that more revenue autonomy of sub national governments brings forth higher levels of growth.
The study underscores the importance of choosing the correct fiscal decentralization variable
which takes into account a country’s institutional structure for making empirical estimations of
impact on economic indicators. It is worth mentioning here that another study (Treisman, 2002),
uses sub-national share in expenditure as the indicator of fiscal decentralization.
Elhiraika (2007) uses provincial level data from South Africa to examine how fiscal
decentralization, and specifically own-source revenue, impacts basic service delivery. The South
African federal system is characterized by a relatively high degree of fiscal decentralization in
terms of expenditure responsibilities and administration. However, the sub national governments
have extremely limited revenue autonomy and are highly dependent on inter-governmental
transfers from the central government. The author finds an inverse relationship between ownsource revenue and demand for health services, while the demand for education spending is

5 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
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positively related, though the statistical coefficient is not significant. The paper argues for
greater revenue autonomy for sub national governments in South Africa if they are to improve
service delivery and increase their accountability to the local population.

2.2.1 Decentralization and corruption
Fjeldstad (2003) reviews the literature on decentralization and corruption and finds that
there are relatively few publications that have explicitly studied linkages between them. Fisman
and Gatti (2002) examine the cross country relationship between fiscal decentralization and
corruption, and find that fiscal decentralization in government expenditures is consistently
associated with lower measured corruption.
According to Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998), comparisons between centralization and
decentralization depend on the relative proneness of national and local governments to capture
by special interest groups. Their major conclusion is that there exists no a priori, unqualified
verdict in favour of the decentralized system, and its success depends upon the existence of an
appropriate set of political and economic institutions. In particular, decentralization initiatives
are more likely to succeed when accompanied by reforms that increase the scope of local
democracy and reduce asset inequality.
Treisman (2002) uses IMF’s GFS data for 166 countries to test for the impact for
decentralization. His results suggest that countries with more tiers of government tend to have
higher perceived corruption and provide public health services and infrastructure less effectively.
Further, smaller local jurisdictions do not increase discipline by intensifying competition for
capital – he finds them to have been associated with higher perceived corruption.

12

In a recent paper, Goodspeed (2011) uses data from the National Index of Corruption and
Good Governance developed by the Mexican government. This is used to construct a panel data
set (over 2001-2007) of Mexican states to study the relationship between funding sources and the
level of corruption in those states. The study finds that greater use of own tax revenues lowers
corruption while greater use of grants increases corruption. The author concludes that the result
suggests that expenditure decentralization that is accompanied by revenue decentralization is
likely to discourage corruption, while expenditure decentralization that is funded by grants tends
to encourage corruption. This paper also finds that poverty, a measure of uninformed citizens,
leads to greater corruption.

2.2.2 Decentralization and Social Capital
De Mello (2000) contends that countries where social and political institutions stimulate
interpersonal trust, civic cooperation, and social cohesiveness tend to have more efficient
governments, better governance systems, and faster growth. He uses cross-country data to show
that fiscal decentralization can boost social capital and therefore be integrated into secondgeneration reforms. He argues that “the development of local democratic traditions, political
participation, and public-spiritedness can also be enhanced by bringing expenditure assignments
closer to revenue sources and hence the electorate. When policy making assignments are
devolved to lower levels of government, citizens are encouraged to take on more responsibility
for social and economic development…” Further, he states that “ ‘closer’ governments
encourage communitywide participatory initiatives, (such) as the formation of groups,
associations, and social/cultural activities among community members, and foster participation
rights. These governments are perceived as more supportive of citizen’s community participation
and engagement of the society in community problem-solving than ‘distant’ governments. ”
13

De Mello (2010) uses empirical evidence based on World Values Survey Data 6 to test the
hypothesis that, by giving people more voice in the decision-making process of the government,
fiscal decentralization fosters social capital. He conducts country-specific regressions for Brazil
and Indonesia and finds that people exposed to decentralization are in general more pro-voice
than their counterparts not exposed to decentralization. He chooses Brazil7 and Indonesia8 since
most of the existing studies focus on mature, rather than emerging- market economies.
Ligthart and van Oudheusden (2011) measure the contribution of fiscal decentralization to
trust in government. They use data from two sets of countries from the World Values Survey,
covering the period 1994–2007, to measure trust in government. The countries in their study
primarily include selected OECD members and some Eastern European and Latin American
countries. They also use IMF’s GFS data on fiscal decentralization. They find that a one
percentage point increase in fiscal decentralization is associated with a roughly four-fifths of a
percentage point increase in trust in government. The paper finds that this beneficial effect of
fiscal decentralization on trust in government is neither limited to nor necessarily large for
relatively decentralized countries.

6 The World Values Survey (WVS) is a worldwide network of social scientists studying changing values and their
impact on social and political life. The WVS in collaboration with EVS (European Values Study) carried out
representative national surveys in 97 societies containing almost 90 percent of the world's population. These surveys
show pervasive changes in what people want out of life and what they believe. In order to monitor these changes,
the EVS/WVS has executed five waves of surveys, from 1981 to 2007. (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org)
7 In Brazil, a new constitution was promulgated in 1988 granting the states and municipalities additional
policymaking powers, especially in the revenue and expenditure areas. Important tax bases were devolved to the
subnational governments, and the country’s revenue-sharing system was also reformed.
8 Indonesia enacted legislation in 1999, and implemented its decentralization programme in 2001. This consisted of
wide-ranging measures to grant the subnational jurisdictions political and policymaking autonomy in revenue and
expenditure functions.

14

The authors emphasize the policy implications of their results. They point out that policy
recommendations on fiscal decentralization have typically been based on perceived
improvements in allocative efficiency. The recognition of the impact on trust in government will
therefore lead to a more comprehensive assessment of the impacts of fiscal decentralization.

2.2.3 Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Expenditure Decisions
McNab et al (2005) use IMF’s GFS panel data for 59 developed and developing economies
spanning over a period of 30 years to examine the role of decentralization on the composition of
public expenditures. They find that decentralization leads to a higher share of publicly provided
private goods in total government expenditures. The authors conclude that decentralization
trends all over the world are likely to result in a reallocation of resources in the public sector
from central to sub-national governments. The resultant increase in expenditures on health and
education shall increase allocative efficiency and welfare, and strengthen the efforts for poverty
alleviation and for improving economic growth.
Barankay and Lockwood (2006) use panel data from Swiss cantons to test the association
between expenditure decentralization and the productive-efficiency of government. They find
evidence that more fiscal decentralization is associated with higher educational attainment. In
fact, they find that the efficiency gains lead to larger benefits from educational decentralization,
and a resultant closing of the gender education gap in the Swiss case.
The authors survey the existing literature on fiscal decentralization which is based on IMF’s
GFS data. They point out two main problems with the methods adopted in the existing literature
on fiscal decentralization. First, IMF’s measure of fiscal decentralization does not accurately
measure the true autonomy of sub-national governments to choose expenditures and set taxes.
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Second, the authors argue that these studies do not estimate government’s production functions;
that is, they do not control for the various inputs that might be influencing the observed
outcomes9. This is mostly due to lack of availability of quality data at the sub-national level on
these indicators.
Sacchi and Salotti (2012) use IMF and OECD data for 21 developed countries over the
period 1972-2006 to investigate the reasons for decentralization of different categories of
government expenditures, and the roles played by the taxing powers of sub-national governments
and by the grants received from higher levels of government in determining the composition of
local expenditures and their impacts on a number of socio-economic variables.
The authors find that tax decentralization is positively correlated with expenditures on
healthcare, education, housing, and public order; it is negatively associated with expenditure on
social protection. They conclude that their findings are suggestive of increasing consistency
between those that benefit from the programs and those who end up financing and paying for
them. They also find that the effect of tax decentralization on these outcomes is stronger than
that of intergovernmental transfers. They find a positive relationship between grants and
expenditure decentralization of housing and public order. They also find that more tax autonomy
leads subnational governments to spend more on both healthcare and housing.

2.3 Studies on Decentralization in India
Bahl et al (2009) study the fiscal performance of rural local governments in the state of West
Bengal. They find that 72% of population of the state resides in rural areas but rural local

9 For instance, while studying health outputs, one needs to control for inputs such as health expenditures, number of
doctors, and other medical staff per capita, and so on.
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governments spend less than 17% of government expenditures. 96 % of all revenues are raised at
the state government level. Own-source revenues account for less than 1% of the total revenues
of panchayats. Budgets of panchayats are dominated by spending for capital purposes with a
large variation among panchayats in per capita spending levels. Literacy rate exerts a positive
marginal effect on spending. While own-source revenues are very small, yet literacy rate appears
to be a significant determinant for the levels of revenue mobilization. They also find that half the
panchayats run annual budget surpluses indicating that they seem to suffer from a serious
capacity problem which results in the inability to spend available funds. The authors also suggest
various reform options to the Government of West Bengal for strengthening own-source
revenues and expenditure assignment of panchayats.
Asfaw et al (2007) examine health outcomes due to fiscal decentralization in India. They
use state-level data for the period 1990–1997 from the Registrar General of India on infant
mortality rates, Finance Commission data on expenditure and revenues of rural local bodies and
Election Commission data on participation of women and voter turn-out in elections (to construct
an index of political decentralization). The authors test the hypothesis that increasing fiscal
decentralization affects rural infant mortality rates irrespective of the level of political
decentralization.

Their study concludes that states which have performed better in fiscal

decentralization indicators have also performed better in the reduction of rural infant mortality
rate. They obtain a significant and negative correlation between the growth rates of panchayats’
share in total expenditure and the average growth rate of the rural infant mortality. They also find
that higher per capita income plays a significant role in reducing infant mortality rates. The study
calculates the income elasticity of per capita income with respect to rural infant mortality rate as
0.27. In their empirical regression for explaining the variation in infant mortality rates, the
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coefficient on the variable for female literacy is negative and significant, thereby indicating the
importance of women’s literacy in reducing infant mortality.
The authors conclude that fiscal decentralization can play a significant role in improving
health outcomes such as infant mortality rates. However, the study points out that a high level of
fiscal decentralization alone may not bring about the desired level of results unless it is also
accompanied by political decentralization. The authors caution that fiscal decentralization may
actually worsen the provision of health services and consequently may lead to deterioration in
health outcomes if the local communities do not actively participate in the decision-making and
implementation process.
Singh (2002) surveys the performance of panchayats in Madhya Pradesh after being in place
for the first four years (1994-1998) after they were re-constituted under the new Panchayat Act
of 1993. He notes that the success of the new panchayati raj system depends largely on the
“congruence of the perception and commitment of the people, their leaders and officials, about
the role to be played by them in the new system”.
He summarizes their performance overall as disappointing; pointing out that people’s
participation in panchayat meetings and gram sabhas has been very low. As per his analysis, the
responsibility entrusted to panchayats rests on the assumption that though in a village society,
there are deep schisms of caste, class and gender, an organic community still exists and that
given appropriate legal and institutional spaces, it can act cogently and responsibly as a
community. It is also assumed that these collectives at the village level (panchayat and gram
sabha) would be a more reliable vehicle of good governance than a relatively unencumbered
bureaucracy or local elected representatives.
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2.3.1 Decentralization: Does the gender of the village leader matter?
Some recent studies examine the result of affirmative action in terms of women’s
performance as political leaders and their delivery of public goods and services.
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) use political reservation for women in Panchayats in India
to study the impact of women’s leadership on policy decisions.

The 73 rd Amendment to the

Constitution of India in 1993 provided that one third of the seats in all panchayats, as well as one
third of the panchayat positions, must be reserved for women. Further, positions of members and
chairpersons (Sarpanch) of panchayats at all the three levels were also reserved for Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes in proportion of their population share in the panchayat. This study
uses primary data collected from 265 village councils in the states of West Bengal and Rajasthan
and compares the type of public goods provided in reserved (for women) and unreserved
panchayats. Since panchayats are responsible for the provision of many local public goods in
rural areas, the study examines the impact of reservation of the position of chairperson of the
village panchayat on the type of public good provided.
Chattopadhyay and Duflo find that representation of women has important effects on policy
decisions in local government. Specifically, women elected as leaders under the reservation
policy invest more in the public goods more closely linked to women’s concerns 10 – drinking
water and roads in West Bengal and drinking water in Rajasthan. They invest less in public
goods that are more closely linked to men’s concerns – education in West Bengal and roads in
Rajasthan. The authors observe that this is an expected pattern of revealed preferences, in view
of the activities of both men and women in these areas. Women are in charge of collecting
10

The authors use the formal requests brought to the Gram Panchayat as a proxy for gender preferences. In West
Bengal, women complain more often about drinking water and roads than men. In Rajasthan, women complain more
about drinking water, but not as much about roads, compared to men.
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drinking water, and they are the primary recipients of welfare programs (maternity pension,
widow’s pension, and old age pension for the destitute, who tend to be women). In West Bengal,
they are the main source of labor employed on the roads. In Rajasthan, both men and women
work on roads, and the employment motive is therefore common. However, men travel very
frequently out of the villages in search of work, while women do not travel long distances;
accordingly, men have a stronger need for good roads.
In this model, allocations are more closely aligned to women’s needs in reserved
panchayats because of the reduction in the cost of speaking for women and expressing their
needs to a woman sarpanch. The study concludes that leaders invest more in infrastructure that
is directly relevant to the needs of their own genders.

2.4 Affirmative Action in favor of disadvantaged communities in
local governments
When India became a republic in 1950, its Constitution provided for reservations for
historically disadvantaged groups called Scheduled Castes11 (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes12 (STs)
in the State and Central Legislative bodies [i.e. in the Central Parliament, and in the State
Legislative Assemblies]. The main objective of providing reservations to these communities is to
make progress towards a representative democracy where those subject to policy also have a
voice in its making.

The Constitution Amendment Act of 1992 continued with the same

11 ‘Scheduled Castes’ is the legal term for the groups recognized by the Indian Constitution to be especially
disadvantaged because of their past history of inferior treatment in Indian society, and are entitled to certain rights
and preferential treatment.
12 ‘Scheduled Tribes’ is the legal term for communities who were historically largely resident in isolated areas.
These groups or communities are also entitled to certain rights and preferential treatment because of their long
isolation from the ‘mainstream’ community and their low socio-economic development.
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objective of providing a representative democracy at the grassroots level and stipulated
reservations at all three levels of panchayats13 in rural areas for scheduled castes and tribes.
Rohini Pande (2003) examines the role of mandated political representation in providing
disadvantaged groups influence over policy-making.

She finds that political reservation

increases transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate. Using the population data on SCs
and STs from census and spending variations at the state level, she finds evidence that increases
in ST reservations, but not SC reservations, were associated with higher total spending in states.
However, ST reservation was found to be negatively associated with the spending on education.
She also finds that an increase in the number of legislators belonging to scheduled castes and
tribes does not seem to affect the likelihood of land reforms.
Pande finds a positive correlation between SC reservations and job quotas. However, the
increase in ST reservations does not appear to be similarly associated with job quotas. She
observes that increase in job quotas with SC reservation and increase in spending on ST welfare
programs is consistent with differences in the characteristics of SC and ST groups. Relative to
STs, SC groups are both more educated and geographically more dispersed. Hence, their relative
returns from individual- specific policies, such as job quotas, are higher. Finally, this study also
finds that increases in population shares of SCs are associated with increases in job quotas and
reductions in welfare spending on STs. In contrast, increase in the population shares of STs does
not appear to have a similar impact. This is a reflection of the significant difference in the
political activism of members of these two groups. The study attributes these results to the

13 Panchayats are local institutions of self government in rural areas. ‘Panch’ means five, thus, literally translated,
‘Panchayat’ means a body of five persons. The name continues, though members number more than five.
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observation that SCs have emerged as an important and critical block in post-independence
India, while STs have remained, by and large, politically marginalized.
Heller (2000) examines the issue of how political rights are translated into social rights and
discussed the challenges in transforming a procedural democracy to a substantive one. He draws
attention to the challenges faced in democratization, namely, first, that most states and those who
control them have little interest in decentralization. Second, that a big institutional inertia that
needs to be overcome, and third, the task of decentralization itself is enormous: in terms of rules,
regulations, resources, both human and material, capacity building and so on. He proposes a
model that he calls an ‘optimist-conflict model’ wherein he recognizes the transformative
potential of politics, such that the resultant institutions can manage a delicate equilibrium
between representation and participation and pertinently, between public goods and local
preferences.
Examining the outcomes of decentralization in the state of Kerala, Heller finds that although
participation of the traditionally marginalized communities such as the dalits14 (SCs) and women
is still not complete, yet it has increased substantially. Autonomous decision making is evidently
reflected in the shift in allocative priorities, with greater resources having gone to housing
schemes, sanitation and drinking water. He also finds that developmental efforts of local
governments are impaired by fiscal restraint and limited financial discretion.

2.5 Strengthening the institution of Local bodies
The outcomes of decentralization critically depend on the capacities of local bodies to
effectively and efficiently deliver public services. While it takes time for capacities to develop,
14 Another name for scheduled castes.
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the availability of resources impacts the quality of personnel, and in turn, their ability to plan and
deliver public services, and collect monies.
It has often been argued that local bodies in India have a limited resource base, and limited
capacities to govern effectively. Recognizing the need for capacity-building, the central and state
governments have put in place various training programs and transferred grants to strengthen
these institutions of local self-government. However, it has often been observed that local bodies
seem reluctant to exercise the powers of taxation conferred upon them. Successive Central
Finance Commissions have also noted the low utilization of fiscal authority by local
governments- both urban and rural.
Rajaraman (2004) examines panchayat finances and the system of grants to the panchayats
by the state and central governments. She presents data on panchayat revenues from various
states in India collected by the State Finance Commissions. Rajaraman notes that there is a
general revenue-pessimism regarding the capability and capacity of panchayats, and that while
most states have assigned taxes which have been labeled obligatory, there is no floor-rate for
imposition of such taxes in any state. Panchayats also do not have any incentive from central or
state governments for collecting these taxes. However, she disagrees with the view that this is an
indication of limited fiscal capacities.
Rajaraman advocates that the grants recommended by the Central and State Finance
Commissions for panchayats must have some incentive built-in to encourage revenue collection.
She notes that such incentive-grants must be based on a robust criterion. Such grants should have
a low cost of assessment, be cross-sectionally fair in the assessment of revenue potential across
panchayat jurisdictions, and must distinguish between revenue effort and the underlying revenue
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potential (since matching grants fail on the last count). Further, State grants must not be so
structured as to carry adverse policy incentives such as bail-outs for fiscal indiscipline. She
proposes that state allocations for panchayats be made after deducting baseline calculations of
local revenue potential, which is deemed to have been collected at specified floor rates. This
local revenue potential of a panchayat may be estimated using crop-composition of agricultural
lands and crop-specific returns.
The Thirteenth Finance Commission also recognized the need for strengthening these
institutions and recommended that the State Governments should incentivize revenue collection
by local bodies through methods such as mandating some or all local taxes as obligatory at nonzero rates of levy, by deducting deemed own revenue collection from transfer entitlements of
local bodies, or through a system of matching grants.
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Chapter 3
Decentralization of power: the Indian Experience

3.1 Nature of polity in India
India obtained freedom from the British Empire in 1947 and adopted its Constitution
(Constitution of India) in 1950. The Constitution provided for a Parliamentary democracy with a
two tier federal structure. Today, India has a strong central government, and 28 directly elected
state governments. During the first four decades after independence, a largely top down approach
to nation building was followed. The socialist influence and planning ideology resulted in
centralization of power and authority with the federal government, with little devolution to the
lower levels of government.
Local institutions of self-government had existed in India for a long time before
independence, albeit in an informal manner. Indian villages had the institution of panchayats,
which were responsible for regulating conduct in village society, deciding on the agenda of
development, managing common property resources and resolving petty disputes.
In modern times, especially during the first four decades after India’s independence, the role
of panchayats had declined significantly. They lost their rightful place as a local institution for
governance to the more powerful governance structures at the central and state levels and their
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bureaucracies. The function of panchayats became restricted to maintenance of social harmony
in the villages. Delivery of public goods and services, management of common property
resources and development planning were taken over by the agents of the central and state
governments.

3.2 73rd and 74th amendments of the Constitution
A significant milestone in the history of the Indian polity came about with the enactment of
the 73rd and 74th amendments of the Constitution in 1992. These amendments gave a
constitutional mandate to the institutions of self-government for rural areas (panchayats) and for
urban areas (municipalities), and provided uniformity and a formal structure to the traditional
institutions of self-governance and laid down guidelines for their effective functioning. The
legislative intent behind these amendments was to bring about decentralization and democracy at
the grassroot level and extension of power to the people. Since ‘local government’ is listed as a
state subject15, states are responsible for framing laws to bring their systems of local governance
in conformity with the provisions of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional amendments.

3.2.1 Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act 1992: Establishment of Panchayati
Raj
The Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act 1992 came into force on 24th April 1993. The Act
provides a Constitutional status to panchayats and gives uniformity to their organizational
structure across the country by mandating a three tier system (with panchayats at the village,
intermediate, and district levels). Except for the smaller states with population not exceeding 2
15 The Constitution of India details the division of powers between the central and state legislatures in three lists.
The first list lays down the jurisdiction of the Centre (federal government), the second, of the states, and the third
list, called the concurrent list consists of common jurisdiction areas. Entry 5, in list 2 (state list), of the 7th Schedule
of the Constitution of India reads as: “Local government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal
corporations, improvement trusts, district boards, mining settlement authorities and other local authorities for the
purpose of local self-government or village administration.”
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million (where panchayats at the intermediate level may not be constituted), panchayats are to be
constituted in every state, at the village, intermediate and district levels16. In addition, a general
assembly, known as the gram sabha17, is to be constituted at the village level. All seats in
panchayats are to be filled through direct elections. Seats are reserved for scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes in every panchayat in proportion to their population at each level. Further, not
less than 1/3rd of seats are reserved for women in each category. The establishment of
independent State Election Commissions ensures greater confidence in free and fair elections to
panchayats. A uniform term of 5 years is prescribed for all levels of panchayats.
Panchayats have been given the responsibility to prepare plans for economic development
and social justice, and to implement the schemes entrusted to them. The 11th Schedule of the
Constitution of India lists 29 subjects which are entrusted to panchayats, such as agriculture, land
improvement, fisheries, drinking water, maintenance of community assets etc. Panchayats are
empowered to levy and collect taxes, duties, tolls and fees assigned to them by the state
government. However, the extent of devolution of powers and authority to panchayats varies
across states, since the discretion to devolve powers and authority to panchayats lies with state
legislatures.
State governments are required to constitute a Finance Commission once every five years to
review the financial position of panchayats and to make recommendations for distribution
between the state and the local bodies of the net proceeds of taxes, duties, tolls and fees leviable

16 The panchayats at the lowest level comprise of a village or a cluster of small villages, and are known as ‘gram
panchayats’. Villages are grouped into blocks or samitis, where each block usually comprises 50-70 villages. The
panchayat at the block level is called the ‘janpad panchayat’ or ‘panchayat samiti’. A district usually has 5-7 blocks,
and the panchayat at the district level is called the ‘zila panchayat’.
17 "Gram Sabha" means a body consisting of everyone registered in the electoral rolls of the village.
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by the state, determine taxes, duties etc. which may be assigned to panchayats, recommend
grants-in-aid to panchayats from the state and to examine measures needed to improve the
financial position of panchayats.

3.2.2 Extension of Panchayati Raj to Scheduled Areas18 (PESA Act)
The Indian Parliament enacted ‘The Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the
Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996’ to provide for special provisions for panchayats in scheduled areas.
This legislation recognized the traditional rights of tribal communities over “community
resources”—that is, land, water, and forests. The Gram Sabha19 is entrusted the power to manage
community resources and to select beneficiaries of welfare schemes.

3.3 Performance of States in decentralization
The extent of decentralization across various states in India has not been even. While the
Constitution provides for jurisdiction of the local bodies over 29 subjects, effective transfer of
funds, functions and functionaries (3Fs) has not taken place in many states.
Government of India has reviewed the performance of states in decentralizing the 3Fs
through a devolution index. The comparative ranking, published by Government of India 20 is
reproduced below in Table III-A. As is evident from this table, the three south Indian states-

18 Certain areas which have predominantly tribal populations have been declared as scheduled areas, under
Schedule V of the Indian Constitution. Special laws can be enacted for these areas to prevent alienation of land from
the indigenous communities, to preserve their traditional forest based livelihoods and to provide for special
governance structures in accordance with the local customs and traditions.
19 The Gram Sabha has been entrusted the responsibility to safeguard and preserve the traditions and customs of the
people, monitor the use of community resources, and deliver the customary mode of dispute resolution.
20 Press Note: N-11013/2/Pol.II, Dated 02.03.2009, Panchayat Empowerment & Accountability Incentive Scheme
(PEAIS)- Assessment of the States for 2008-09, Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India.
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Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala - have consistently been ranked in the top 5 since 2005-06.
Madhya Pradesh, the focus-state of this paper, achieved the highest rank in 2008-09, due to some
innovative reforms where effective control over field staff and functionaries was given to
Panchayats and Municipalities21.
Table III-A: Ranking of States as per the Devolution Index
States
Madhya Pradesh
West Bengal
Tamil Nadu
Kerala
Karnataka
Sikkim
Himachal Pradesh
Haryana
Chhattisgarh
Assam
Andhra Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh
Maharashtra
Arunachal Pradesh
Rajasthan
Goa
Tripura
Orissa
Bihar
Punjab
Manipur

2008-09
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

2007-08
6
3
1
2
4
10
7
13

2006-07
6
3
4
1
2
5
10

2005-06
3
1
1
4
7
4

9
8
8

5
12

8

9

7

6

11

Source: Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India

3.4 Finances of Panchayats

21 Construction of the devolution index and scores for 3Fs for states for 2008-09 are given in Appendix A.
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The Constitution lists 29 subjects under the jurisdiction of the panchayats, and they have
also been given various taxation powers. In practice however, panchayats in most parts of the
country generally do not levy or collect taxes assigned to them, and remain dependent on
transfers from higher levels of government (Table III-B). These transfers are often tied22 to the
execution of certain works or for giving welfare grants to beneficiaries. As a result, panchayats
have little resources to plan and implement works as per local priorities. They have not been able
to establish themselves as effective institutions of self-governance in most parts of the country.
Most panchayats have been restricted to performing an agency role for the state and central
government. Only in some states, for example, in Karnataka, Kerala, West Bengal, Gujarat,
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, panchayats raise significant revenues that enable them to
effectively deliver some public goods and services.
Table III-B: Revenue Significance of Panchayat Raj Institutions
Year

Total
Panchayat
Revenue
(Rs. crore)

Percentage
of GDP

1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03

17,296
22,264
23,244
22,470
24,011

0.99
1.14
1.11
0.99
0.98

Relative share of Total Panchayat Revenue
(as per cent of Total Revenue of)
State
Central
Combined State and
Govt.
Govt.
Central Govts.
10.0
11.0
10.0
9.0
8.8

11.6
12.3
12.1
11.2
10.4

6.0
6.5
6.1
5.6
5.3

Source: Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission, Government of India.

22 Panchayats get funds for carrying out development activities such as construction of village roads, public toilets,
school buildings, shelters etc. These are distributed by state and central governments according to a formula decided
by the State and Central Finance Commission respectively. Since the end-use of the fund is pre-determined,
panchayats merely act as an agency of the State or Central government. These funds are thus called ‘tied’ funds.
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Let us first examine the framework provided under the Constitution for the fiscal
independence of the panchayats. The Constitution provides for the establishment of Finance
Commissions (FC) every five years, both at the central 23 and at the state levels24 (State Finance
Commissions or SFCs). The Central FCs shall recommend sharing of tax and non-tax revenues
of the center with the states. The State FCs recommend sharing of the states’ revenues with their
local bodies.
Thirteen Central FCs have been constituted so far; the thirteenth one (FC-XIII), submitted
its report in 2009. Beginning from the tenth FC (FC-X), the commissions have also examined the
status of panchayat and municipal finances and have recommended the criterion and the financial
resources that may be devolved to the local governments from the center directly.
The FC-X made recommendations regarding measures to augment the consolidated funds
of the states for strengthening local bodies. Lack of data on panchayat finances and expenditures
has, however, been a major constraint for the FCs. In the absence of reliable data, the FC-X and
FC-XI recommended ad-hoc grants. The FC-X, which made recommendations for the period
1995-2000, recommended a grant of Rs. 100 per capita of rural population25 for the Panchayats.
The terms of reference of the eleventh FC (FC-XI) explicitly required it to suggest measures
to augment the consolidated funds of states to enable them to supplement the resources of local
bodies. FC-XI recommended a grant of Rs. 100 billion for local governments (Rs. 4 billion per
annum for municipalities and Rs. 16 billion per annum for panchayats) for a period of five years

23 Article 280, Constitution of India.
24 Article 243-I, Constitution of India.
25 Rural Population calculated as per the 1971 census.
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beginning with 2000-01 to 2004-05. It recommended the transfer of grants according to a
formula based on population (40%), geographical area (10%), and ‘distance’ from highest
average per capita agricultural income (20%), revenue effort (10%), and an index of
decentralization 26 (20%).
FC-XII also examined the measures needed to augment the consolidated fund of states to
supplement the resources of the panchayats and municipalities. It was to formulate its
recommendations on the basis of the recommendations made by the various SFCs. FC-XII
however noted that the SFC reports failed to provide a sound basis for estimation of the required
augmentation of the consolidated funds of the States. It also pointed out the lack of reliable data
about the revenues and expenditures of local bodies. As per its own estimates, local bodies raised
just 1.9% of total own revenues, while they incurred more than 5% of expenditures. This
revenue-expenditure mismatch was greater for panchayats. The findings of the Commission are
presented in table III-C.
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The Index of Decentralization has been constructed using the following criteria:
i.
Enactment/amendment of State panchayat/municipal legislation;
ii.
Intervention / restriction in the functioning of local bodies;
iii.
Assignment of functions to the local bodies by State legislation;
iv.
Actual transfer of functions to these bodies by way of rules, notifications and orders;
v.
Assignment of powers of taxation to the local bodies;
vi.
Levy of taxes by the local bodies;
vii.
Constitution of State Finance Commissions;
viii.
The extent of action taken on their reports;
ix.
Elections to the local bodies; and
x.
Constitution of District Planning Committees.
Details of the construction of the Index can be seen at page 310, Appendix VIII.1 of the report of the XIth Finance
Commission of India, available at
http://fincomindia.nic.in/writereaddata/html_en_files/oldcommission_html/fcreport/11threport.p
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Table III-C: Revenue and Expenditure Decentralization in India 2002-03
Level of
Government

Rev

Rev
raised accrual

Expenditures Percent of
Own
Revenues

Percent of
Revenue
Accrual

Percent of
Total
Expenditure

Centre

11.96

(% of GDP)
8.14
13.66

62.0

(%of Total)
40.6
44.6

States

6.97

10.43

15.45

36.1

52.0

50.4

Local

0.36

1.48

1.55

1.9

7.4

5.1

Urban

0.3

0.51

0.57

1.6

2.5

1.9

Rural

0.07

0.97

0.98

0.3

4.8

3.2

Total

19.96

21.04

30.66

100.0

100.0

100.0

Source: Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India; Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission,
2005

Based on a five-fold criteria which included population, ‘distance’ from highest per capita
income, revenue effort, geographical area, and an index of deprivation (poverty measure), FCXII recommended a sum of Rs.180 billion for panchayats and Rs.50 billion for municipalities for
the five year period starting from 2005-06.
The Thirteenth Finance Commission (FC-XIII), which submitted its report in December
2009, underlined the need to support local bodies through a predictable and buoyant source of
revenues and at the same time, streamline the functioning of the bodies themselves, and make
them more accountable. The FC also introduced a grant to incentivize performance by the local
bodies.
FC-XIII recommended, inter alia, that state governments should strengthen their local fund
audit departments through capacity building as well as personnel augmentation. They should
incentivize revenue collection by mandating some or all local taxes as obligatory at non-zero
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rates of levy, and by deducting deemed own revenue collection from transfer entitlements of
local bodies, or through a system of matching grants.

Table III-D: Amounts Allocated by Central Finance Commission to Local Bodies
(in Rs. million)
Commission

Amount Allocated

PRIs
43809.3*
FC-X (1995-2000)
80000
FC-XI (2000-05)
180000
FC-XII (2005-09)
FC-XIII (2010-15)** 630505

ULBs
10000
20000
45000
231110

Devolution as percentage
of divisible pool
1.38
0.78
1.24
2.28

Source: Report of the XIIIth FC (Vol. I), Dec 2009
* Rs 100 per capita of rural population.
** FC-XIII also recommended a special area grant of Rs. 13571 million

The constitution of State Finance Commissions across all the states in the country has been
highly uneven. The XIth FC observed that there was a lack of synchronicity in the periods
covered by the reports of the SFCs and the central FCs and the SFC reports are characterized by
an extreme diversity in their approach, their content, the period covered and their quality. In fact,
the XIIIth FC reported that many states had not even constituted a finance commission at the
stipulated intervals27. The XIIIth FC also recommended a uniform template for the SFCs to
prepare their reports henceforth.

3.5

Madhya Pradesh: the decentralization experience
Madhya Pradesh is a geographically large state in India, situated in the center of the country.

The word ‘madhya’ means ‘center’. The state is spread out over 308,000 square kilometers and

27 Report of the Thirteenth Finance Commission, Volume I, page 422
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has a population of about 60.3 million according to the 2001 census. Scheduled tribes comprise
nearly 20% of the state’s population (as compared to an average of 8.2% for India). Table III-E
shows some important statistics for the state.
Table III-E: Important Statistics: Madhya Pradesh (2001)28
Population (Census 2001)

60.35 million

Male

31.44 million

Female

28.90 million

Scheduled Tribes (Census 1991)

12.23 million

Scheduled Castes (Census 1991)

9.16 million

Area (in sq. kms.)

308,000

Districts29

45

Tehsils

272

Development Blocks
Total villages

313
55,393

Populated villages

52,143

Village Panchayats

23,051

Block Panchayats

313

District Panchayats
Literacy rate

45
64.1 percent

Male

76.5 percent

Female

50.6 percent

Density of Population

196 per sq. kms.

Source: Handbook of Statistics, 2007, Department of Planning and Statistics, Government of Madhya Pradesh.

28 These figures are from the 2001 census. While the 2011 census has also been conducted, only provisional figures
are available currently.
29 As in 2001. New districts were subsequently carved out. In 2010, there were 50 districts.
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3.6 Panchayats in Madhya Pradesh
Madhya Pradesh (M.P) has had a long tradition of panchayats. As mentioned earlier, village
panchayats in this region, as in most parts of the Indian subcontinent, had the traditional role of
maintenance of societal harmony, management of common property resources and resolution of
petty disputes.
The Balwant Rai Mehta Committee, constituted by the Central Government, recommended
the methodology of ‘planning from below’ in 1957. Based on the recommendations of the
committee, the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Act 1962 was enacted. It assigned the panchayats a
limited function of maintenance of local assets, but did not assign them developmental
responsibilities. Elections to the panchayat institutions were also not conducted regularly,
rendering them largely ineffective.
In 1977, Government of India set up another committee headed by Prof. M. L. Dantwala to
look at possible measures to promote blocks30 as institutions for implementation of rural
development programmes. The Ashok Mehta Committee, set up in 1978, examined the state of
finances of local bodies and recommended measures for strengthening the financial resources of
the three-tier Panchayat Raj Institutions.
In Madhya Pradesh, as a follow-up of the recommendations of the above-mentioned two
committees, the responsibility for planning and implementation of rural development programs

30 Also known as development blocks. Each block usually comprises of a contiguous cluster of 50-100 villages.
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was entrusted to development blocks31, while in some neighbouring states, such as Maharashtra
and Gujarat, this responsibility was vested in the district panchayats.
Subsequently, the Madhya Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act enacted in 1990 provided for direct
elections to the panchayats at village, block and district levels (three tier structure). This Act also
stipulated the role of political parties in the elections and provided for transfer of resources and
development functionaries to panchayats. The Act, however, could not be implemented very
successfully due to lack of political will and administrative apathy.
Madhya Pradesh was the first state in the country to enact its own legislation, called the
Madhya Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1993, in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992. The stated objective of the 1993 Act was to ‘consolidate
and amend the law relating to establishment of panchayats, with a view to ensure effective
involvement of the Panchayati Raj Institutions in the local administration and developmental
activities’.

3.7 The Madhya Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1993
The Madhya Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 199332 provides for a three-tier structure of local
self-governments in rural areas. Zila Panchayats have been established at the district level,
Janpad Panchayats at the block level and Gram Panchayats at the village level. The general body
of the village is called the Gram Sabha.

31 The jurisdiction of a development block is usually the same as the that of the intermediate level panchayat.
32 The Madhya Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act was amended in 2001 and renamed as the Madhya Pradesh Panchayati
Raj and Gram Swaraj Act. ‘Gram Swaraj’ means village self-rule.
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3.7.1 Composition of Panchayats and Gram Sabha
Gram Panchayat: A gram panchayat usually has a population of not less than 1000 and
comprises of at least one village. Each gram panchayat is divided into wards or constituencies
from which a member or Pancha is elected. The total number of wards in a gram panchayat is
usually between 10 and 20, with each ward comprising of a population of around 100 residents.
The Sarpanch33 is directly elected and chairs the gram panchayat. The elected members of the
gram panchayat elect the vice-chairman from amongst themselves.
Janpad Panchayat: The intermediate level panchayat, called the janpad panchayat, has a
geographical jurisdiction which coincides with that of the development block. Each block or
janpad comprises of about 10 to 25 constituencies, each of which has a population of around
3000-5000. The members of the janpad panchayat are elected directly from each constituency.
All members of the State Legislative Assembly (MLAs) and one-fifth of all the sarpanches (by
rotation, for a one-year term) are also members of the janpad panchayat. In scheduled areas 34, the
state government may also nominate persons belonging to a particular tribe to the janpad
panchayat. The president and vice-president of the janpad panchayat are elected by the elected
members of the janpad panchayat from amongst themselves.
Zila Panchayat: The district level panchayat, called zila panchayat, has 10 to 35 directly
elected members. All presidents of janpad panchayats in the district, members of the Parliament
and State Legislative Assembly, whose constituencies fall fully/partially in the district, are also
members of the district panchayat. In the scheduled areas, state governments can also nominate
persons belonging to a particular tribe to the district panchayat. The president and the vice33 Sarpanch: Head/Chairperson of the Panchayat
34 Predominantly tribal areas, thus notified under the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution of India.
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president of the district panchayat are elected by the directly elected members of the district
panchayat from amongst themselves.

Table III-F: Elected Representatives of Panchayats
(Percentages in parentheses)
Categories
Gram Panchayat
Janpad Panchayat
Zila Panchayat

Unreserved
147593
(38)
2736
(38.2)
332
(37.6)

SC
59889
(15.4)
1078
(15.1)
136
(15.4)

ST
110744
(28.5)
1972
(27.5)
222
(25.1)

OBC
70603
(18.1)
1378
(19.3)
194
(21.9)

Total
388829
(100)
7164
(100)
884
(100)

Women
131671
(33.9)
2393
(33.4)
304
(34.4)

Source: Administrative Report, Panchayat and Rural Development Department, Government of Madhya
Pradesh, 2007-08

Gram Sabha: The gram sabha is the general assembly of a village. Since a panchayat may
have one or more constituent villages, each constituent village shall have its own gram sabha. A
special dispensation has been provided for scheduled areas35, since tribal communities usually
live in dispersed habitations in forested areas. Accordingly, in these areas, a village comprises of
‘a community managing its affairs with traditions and customs’. Therefore, in these areas a gram
sabha can also be constituted for a habitation or a group of habitations.

3.8 Affirmative Action (Reservation)
The Madhya Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1993 provides for reservations in the posts of
members, and presidents of gram, janpad and district panchayats for scheduled castes, scheduled

35 As per the Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996.
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tribes and other backward castes (OBCs)36, in proportion to their population residing in the area
of the panchayat. Besides, one-third of the seats are reserved for women at each level of
panchayat37 and within each category (SC/ST/ OBC/Unreserved). In scheduled areas, all the
posts of presidents of gram, janpad, and district panchayats are reserved for members belonging
to scheduled tribes. In addition, at least 50 per cent of seats at all levels are reserved for the
candidates from scheduled tribes. As a result, more than 246,000 SCs, STs and OBCs have been
elected as representatives to various levels of panchayats (Table III-F) in Madhya Pradesh.

3.9 Functions of Panchayats
The Constitution of India specifies the functions of panchayats, and groups them as either
compulsory or optional. Some functions are performed as agents or representatives of the state
government. The state governments have the authority to endow powers and authority to the
panchayats as per the local needs. However, it is clearly laid out in the Constitution that the
original function of panchayats is the “preparation of plans for economic development and social
justice”.
In Madhya Pradesh, the functions of District Panchayats can be broadly categorized as
follows:
i.

Planning and Implementation: The district panchayats are responsible for preparation
of annual plans for economic development and social welfare for the district and for
ensuring coordination between the panchayats in the implementation of these plans. The
plans submitted by the janpad panchayats are consolidated and finalized by the district

36 In the Constitution of India, OBCs are described as "socially and educationally backward classes". The
government endeavours to ensure their social and educational development through special measures.
37 In 2007, vide an amendment of the Act, half the seats are now reserved for women within each category in
Madhya Pradesh.

40

panchayat. District panchayats have the responsibility of monitoring the execution of
transferred or delegated functions, works, schemes and projects of the state/central
government.
ii.

Resource Mobilization: District panchayats have the powers to mobilize resources by
exercising the powers entrusted to them by the state government.

iii.

Coordination and guidance to the lower level panchayats in formulation of their own
development plans, execution of rural development schemes and management of their
funds.

iv.

Administration: The District panchayats administer and control the employees
appointed and posted in panchayats including staff transferred by the state government to
the administrative control of panchayats38.
Janpad panchayats monitor the implementation of development activities such as social

forestry, animal husbandry, fisheries, water supply, rural employment programs; regulate
markets, exhibitions and local fairs and perform any other function assigned to them by the state
government. Janpad panchayats supervise the administration of community blocks and function
as a second layer of supervision over the functioning of the gram panchayats within their
jurisdictions, consolidate development plans prepared by the gram panchayats and control the
staff functionaries assigned to them.
Gram panchayats have been assigned the task of preparation of the plans for economic
development of their constituent village(s); management and regulation of rural markets and
fairs; execution of schemes, works and projects entrusted to them by central/state government or
38 In Madhya Pradesh, rural extension workers in fields such as health, agricultural extension, horticulture, animal
husbandry and teachers in primary schools have been brought under the administrative control of the Panchayats.
The appointment of high school teachers and primary school teachers is the responsibility of ZPs and janpad
panchayats respectively.
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by the district/janpad panchayat; and co-ordination and monitoring of the activities of the
committees constituted by the concerned gram sabha(s).
The gram panchayats are also responsible for preparation of annual statement of accounts
and the administrative report, which is required to be ratified by the gram sabha.
Gram sabhas have been assigned a central role in the panchayati raj system. They have
been entrusted the task of approving the development plans drawn up for the villages by the
panchayats, approval of beneficiaries for various social welfare schemes, social audit of the
works carried out by government agencies, and maintenance of peace and harmony in the village
community.
Gram sabhas and panchayats execute their work through standing committees at each level.
The committees at different levels of panchayats are presented in Table III-G below.

3.10 Audit and Review
Accountability of panchayat institutions is ensured through the processes of budgeting,
accounting, auditing and inspections. In addition, in case of any contravention of the powers
conferred on panchayats, such resolutions/decisions could be put in abeyance and could also be
annulled by competent authorities. In extreme cases of malfeasance or abuse of powers, the state
government can dissolve the panchayat, and order fresh elections. The panchayat representatives
have been made personally liable for any loss or mis-utilization of funds allotted to the
panchayat. Social audit is an important provision to ensure accountability of panchayats. Books
of accounts of panchayats are also open to scrutiny of the public and are to be laid before the
annual meeting of the gram sabha.
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Table III-G: Standing Committees of Panchayats
Gram Sabha

Gram Panchayat

Janpad Panchayat

Zila Panchayat

Village
Development

General
Administration

General
Administration

General
Administration

Agriculture

Construction and
Development

Agriculture

Agriculture

Education, Health,
and Community
Resources

Education, Health
and Social Welfare

Education

Education

Infrastructure

Communication and
Works

Communication and
Works

Village Protection

Cooperation and
Industries

Cooperation and
Industries

Social Justice

Health, Women and
Child Welfare

Health, Women and
Child Welfare

Forests

Forests

3.11 Finances of Panchayats
The Madhya Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act has assigned certain compulsory and optional
taxes to panchayats. The obligatory taxes for gram panchayat include property tax on land and
buildings, sanitation tax, light tax, profession tax, market fees and fees for the registration of
cattle. While the rates of property tax on land and buildings are set by the State government,
panchayats are free to levy their own rates of taxation for sanitation, street lights, tapped water
supply, profession tax, market fees, and fees for registration of cattle.
Gram panchayats get their revenue from three sources –
i.

taxes and fees;

ii.

grants-in-aid from the state government, (both general and specific-purpose); and
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iii.

transfer grants from the state government/central government on the recommendations of
the State FC/Central FC.
Only one obligatory tax has been assigned to janpad panchayats, that is, tax on theatre,

theatrical performances and other public entertainments. The district panchayats do not have any
taxes assigned to them. Both the janpad and the district panchayats get revenues mainly from
grants-in-aid from the state government and other grants recommended by the finance
commissions. They also get a share in land revenue39.

3.12 State Finance Commissions in Madhya Pradesh
The Constitution requires that a Finance Commission be constituted by the state government
every five years40with the mandate of reviewing the financial position of local bodies and
recommending the devolution (sharing) of financial resources41 from the state government to the
local bodies. The commission also recommends measures required for better fiscal management
by the state and local governments.
The first State Finance Commission (SFC) for Madhya Pradesh was constituted in 1995.
Its recommendations covered the period from April 1996 to March 2001. Due to a lack of any
reliable data on the status of finances of panchayats, the SFC made ad-hoc recommendations in
order to give a boost to the newly established institutions of self-governance.

39 Land revenue is collected by the field functionaries of the state government. The state government then re-allots
this to the panchayats according to a fixed formula with variables such as population, area and an index of
backwardness of the panchayat.
40 Articles 243 (i) and 243(y) of the Constitution of India
41 net proceeds of taxes, duties, tolls and fees leviable by the state
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Table III-H: MP SFC Reports – Constitution and Recommendations
Finance
Commission
SFC I

Submission of
SFC Report
July 1996

Period
Covered42
1996-97 to
2000-01

SFC II

Dec 2003

2001-02 to
2005-06

SFC III

Nov 2008

2006-07 to
2010-11

Devolution Recommendation
2.91% of total tax and non-tax to PRIs and
0.514% share of the divisible pool to ULBs;
specific grant Rs 676.6 million to PRIs.
2.93% of total tax and non-tax to PRIs and
1.07% to ULBs. Assignment of taxes to LBs
after deduction of 10% collection charges;
establishment grant (administrative
expenses) Rs. 28.40 crore to PRIs and Rs. 5
crore to ZPs for training.
4% of total tax and non-tax to PRIs and 1%
to ULBs.

Source: Report of the XIIIth FC, Vol II; Government of India.

It recommended the devolution of 2.91% of the state’s tax and non-tax revenues starting
from 1997-98 (Rs 1673 million for 1997-98) to the panchayats. The distribution between
panchayats was proposed as per a formula that assigned 70% weight to the population, 25% to
the geographical area and 5% to the revenue collection effort of a panchayat. It also
recommended an annual grant of Rs 15 million for general administrative expenses to district
panchayats, with an annual increase of 10%, and Rs 146.5 million to the janpad panchayats (the
grant recommended to janpad panchayats was not accepted by the state government). The other
recommendations included grant of administrative funds to panchayats to aid them to perform
the agency functions of the state and central governments; separate budget heads in the state
government’s annual budget for funds to be given to panchayats; an ad-hoc grant of Rs 676.6
million to meet the expenses of maintaining staff and other administrative expenditures by

42 In India, the fiscal year runs from April to March. Thus, for example, the fiscal year 1996-97 implies the period
starting from 1 April 1996 to 31 March 1997.
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panchayats; transfer of maintenance of revenue-forests43 and control of local agricultural produce
marketing committees to panchayats; preparation of annual plans by panchayats; and
establishment of a regular system of audit of panchayat accounts and maintenance of a database
covering important aspects of panchayats.
The second State Finance Commission (SFC) was set up in 1999 and it submitted its
report in 2003. Its recommendations covered the period from April 2001 to March 2006. It
recommended the devolution of 2.93% of total tax and non-tax revenues of the state government
to panchayats.
The commission observed that the resources mobilized by majority of panchayats were very
low in relation to their needs. Own resources of gram panchayats could meet only 13.5% of their
revenue expenditures in 1999 – 2000. In other words, gram panchayats depended upon external
sources of finance to fund as much as 87% of their expenditures. The commission was of the
opinion that gram panchayats did not make adequate efforts for resource mobilization, and
suggested that if all gram panchayats levied one or two compulsory taxes assigned to them, their
tax revenues could be stepped up considerably. It estimated that if gram panchayats make
vigorous efforts for resource mobilization, the ratio of own revenue to revenue expenditure could
reach 33% in the next 10 years.
The second SFC Report noted that the experience during the forty years prior to the
Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992 demonstrated that to be successful, decentralization has
to be backed up by strong political will, right type of institutional framework, and necessary
technical and administrative support, along with right type of attitudinal changes in the
43

Forest areas are delineated and classified according to the density of forest-cover; high density forests are
maintained by the state government, and low-density forests, called ‘revenue-forests’ are maintained by panchayats.
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bureaucracy. All these pre-requisites had been missing in the attempts at democratic
decentralization prior to 1992.
The third State Finance Commission submitted its report in November 2008, and its
recommendations covered the period from 1 April 2006 to March 2011. It recommended the
transfer of 5% of the divisible pool resources to the local bodies. Of this 4% was to go to
panchayats and 1% to urban local bodies. The resources for panchayats were to be devolved
according to the following population criterion of its constituent villages: Each village, with a
population of less than 500 (21,527 in number) would be assigned a grant of Rs 100 per capita.
Villages with a population between 501 to 1000 (16235 in number) would get a grant of Rs 75
per capita, and villages with population between 1001 and 1500 (7102 in number) would get a
grant of Rs 60 per capita. Bigger villages, with population over 1500 (7235 in number), would
get a grant of Rs 50 per capita.
For assisting in development of infrastructure, a sum of Rs 1109.5 million was
recommended for gram panchayats. Similarly, a grant of Rs 200 million annually was
recommended for janpad panchayats, and Rs 50 million annually for district panchayats for
maintenance of assets and new infrastructure expenditure. An important recommendation of the
SFC was the reimbursement of electricity bills of those panchayats which maintained piped
water supply schemes in their villages and also levied a user charge for this service.

3.13 Elementary Education: Role of Panchayats
In Madhya Pradesh, the subject of elementary education44 has been transferred to
panchayats for schools located in rural areas. Panchayats certify attendance of teachers, provide

44 Elementary education in India is defined as education from grades 1 to 8.
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hot cooked meals in schools (money for the provisions comes from the central government), and
carry out minor repairs etc.

Table III-I: Panchayat Finances in Madhya Pradesh
Taxes

Compulsory taxes
Optional taxes
Total tax revenue
Non-tax revenue
Total

Own source revenue per
capita (in Rupees per annum
in 2004-05)

Own source revenue as percent of
total revenue (untied) in 2004-05)

10.05
2.80
12.84
3.27
16.11

8.46%
2.35%
10.82%
2.75%
13.57%

Source: Report of Third State Finance Commission, Government of Madhya Pradesh

Panchayats are responsible for ensuring establishment of school councils (similar to parentteacher associations) for every school, which work under their guidance. They have been
entrusted with the overall supervision of the schools, ensuring enrollment of school-age children,
ensuring attendance, distributing scholarships, and maintenance of school libraries.
Salaries of teachers and major construction works (new school building, toilets etc.),
textbooks, uniforms, provisions for hot cooked meals, etc. are all provided for by the state and
central government. Therefore, a major part of the financing of elementary school education
comes from the state/central government but the effectiveness of this expenditure depends on the
involvement of the local panchayat and the local community.
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Recent independent evaluations (ASER 200845) of the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan46 (Universal
Education Mission) have shown that enrollments have gone up and test results have also
improved in panchayats which have effective school councils.

3.14 Female Enrollment Ratio
Improvement in female literacy is a major goal of public policy in Madhya Pradesh which
has one of the lowest literacy rates for women in India. The 2001 Report of Sarva Shiksha
Abhiyan, underlined the poor state of school education in Madhya Pradesh: both the overall
literacy rate, and the rural literacy rate are lower in Madhya Pradesh as compared to the national
averages.

Table III-J: Literacy rates in Madhya Pradesh (2001 census)
Category
SC
ST
Rural
Urban
Overall

Female
43.28
28.44
42.8
70.5
50.28

Madhya Pradesh
Male
Persons
72.33
58.6
53.55
41.2
71.7
57.8
87.4
79.4
76.8
64.1

Female
41.90
34.76
46.1
72.9
53.7

All-India
Male
66.64
59.17
70.7
86.3
75.3

Persons
54.7
47.1
58.7
79.9
64.8

Source: Census of India 2001, and National Literacy Mission of India website: www.nlm.nic.in.

45 Annual Survey of Education Report carried out by Pratham, an independent organization which works for
education of children in India.
46 Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) is a Government of India program for achieving universal elementary education.
The main program components include opening of new schools, strengthening school infrastructure, ensuring
adequate teaching staff, capacity building, and providing special inputs for the girl child in accordance with areaspecific needs.
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The low levels of female literacy in the state are mainly due to low enrollment of girls in
schools, low retention rates and high drop-out rates. Contributory factors for the low enrolment
include gender discrimination, lack of access to schools, lack of amenities in schools such as
toilets, and poverty.
On its part, the state has made sustained efforts to increase access and retention of girls in
schools. Efforts such as provision of hot cooked meals, school uniforms, free text books,
scholarships for female children have been put in place to encourage girls to enroll and continue
in schools. The standing committee on education, health and social welfare of the gram
panchayats (Table III-G) has been entrusted the task of implementing the scheme of hot cooked
meals, distributing uniforms, textbooks, scholarships, etc., and carrying out minor maintenance
of the school building. It is expected, therefore, that panchayats that have access to larger
resources would have made some efforts to improve school infrastructure and promote education
of girls. In this paper, we check whether this is indeed supported by the village level data in
Madhya Pradesh.
Chart 1: Literacy in India and Madhya Pradesh: Census 2001
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Chapter 4
How do panchayats spend?

Does the expenditure pattern of panchayats vary with the mode of fiscal decentralization transfer grants vis-à-vis the assignment of taxes?
In this section, we do not look at overall expenditures of panchayats. The expense account
reflects all the expenditures incurred by panchayats, whether from end-use-specific grants from
the state or central governments or from own resources. The former, as detailed in Chapter 3,
form a major chunk of panchayat expenditures. These are mostly determined according to certain
uniform criterion such as availability of a brick-and mortar building for the village school or
crèche, connectivity to an all-weather road and so on. We are interested in examining the
relationship between (i) what a panchayat spends on and how much, and (ii) its sources of
funding (own sources and grants).
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) show how the gender of a sarpanch influences the type of
public good provided. A priori, however, we would expect that a panchayat’s preferences would
be same, irrespective of the source of its funds because all these funds are ‘untied’ and can be
spent at the discretion of the panchayat. But, when we examine the expenditure pattern of

51

various panchayats, it shows a distinct variation, depending on whether the revenues have been
raised from their own sources or are received as an ‘untied’ transfer grant. We recall that Sacchi
and Salotti (2012) have examined revenue sources and expenditure patterns for 21 countries and
found tax decentralization to be associated with higher expenditures on housing, education and
healthcare, compared to social protection expenditures. They have concluded this to be evidence
of increasing consistency between beneficiaries of public expenditures and its financiers.
Similarly, Goodspeed (2011) has examined sub-national data from Mexican states, and
found that revenue decentralization discourages corruption, while expenditure decentralization
that is funded by grants tends to encourage corruption. It would be expected that lesser
corruption would result in better delivery of public goods.
So, we can ask whether the expenditures of panchayats from own-source revenues are better
aligned with the needs of its residents, compared to transfer grants.
These issues were discussed with many villagers and panchayat functionaries. It appears that
the expenditures of panchayats from own-source revenues seem to be better aligned with
residents’ needs, because the residents are more involved in the decision-making process when
they are the ones who pay directly. We use data collected by the third State Finance Commission
of Madhya Pradesh, described below, to examine the expenditure pattern of panchayats and see
if any patterns or variations can be observed.

4.2 Data Description
The 3rd State Finance Commission (SFC) submitted its report to the Government of Madhya
Pradesh in October 2008. The commission gathered data from gram panchayats, janpads and
district panchayats through a detailed questionnaire which covered demographic, revenue and
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expenditure aspects. It also asked qualitative/subjective questions about the level of satisfaction
of panchayats and tried to gauge the need for funds required for development at the village level.
The SFC collected responses from around 16,000 Panchayats for the years 2003-04 and 2004-05.
We have used this database to derive panchayat-wise data on revenues, expenditures, panchayat
attendance and distances travelled to fetch water within the panchayat. After data cleaning, we
have data on 11,687 panchayats which we have used for our study.
The socio-economic data used for the study is based on the 2001 census. However, census
data does not contain information for each panchayat, but does so for each village. Census data
has been matched to SFC data by matching component villages to panchayats.
Census data has been used to compute various variables such as sex ratio, proportion of
Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Tribes (STs) in population, and literacy rates. In addition, data has
been collected separately from all Districts on status of reservation (by caste and sex) for the
position of sarpanch for 2000-0147 panchayat elections. Table IV-A presents the data description
of major variables. We use this data to examine the relationship between the expenditure pattern
of panchayats and attendance of members of panchayats in its meetings.

47 The 3rd SFC data on panchayats was collected for the years 2003-04 and 2004-05. The elected representatives of
the 2000-01 round of elections were in place at that time.
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Table IV-A: Descriptive statistics of major variables
Variable
Revenue from tanks and
minerals
Panchayat revenue, per
capita
Panchayat revenue from
own sources, per capita
Panchayat revenue from
grants, per capita
Revenue from tanks and
minerals, per capita
Panchayat population
Literacy rate
Female literacy rate
Panchayat sex ratio
SC percent
ST percent
Poverty level48
Area of panchayat
Panchayat attendance49
(per capita)

Obs
11687

Mean
2,730.69

Std. Dev.
20,556.4

Min
0

Max
580,276

11687

351.65

333.09

0.025

2993.05

11687

9.176

33.35

0

949.5

11687

342.48

325.84

0.025

2993.05

11687

2.15

19.42

0

949.5

11687
11687
11687
11687
11687
11687

1566.6
0.47
0.35
931.96
0.161
0.261

914.1
0.128
0.136
68.95
0.126
0.304

124
0.013
0
614.93
0
0

14,799
0.83
0.798
1190.25
1
1

11687
11687
7279

0.594
851.43
0.0083

0.183
539.98
0.000058

0
100
0

1
8484
0.0486

4.3 Attendance in Panchayats and Expenditure Patterns
But, one could well ask, why should attendance in a panchayat be an issue at all? Wouldn’t a
democratically elected representative panchayat be taking decisions that reflect the aspirations
and choices of its constituents?

48 Poverty level = (agricultural labor + casual labor) / total workforce of Panchayat
49 Different panchayats have different number of members, usually in proportion to their population. Therefore, we
have chosen the ratio of total attendance to population of a panchayat as a normalized measure of attendance in
panchayats
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We need to go back to the nature of polity in India, and specifically to Madhya Pradesh, to
understand the relevance of the issue of attendance in panchayat meetings. In India, the transfer
of power to elected panchayats at the village level is a relatively new phenomenon. When our
data for panchayats in Madhya Pradesh was collected (for the fiscal years 2003-04 and 2004-05),
it had only been around ten years, since the first democratically elected statutory bodies, as
envisaged under the 73rd Amendment of the Constitution, were put in place. The traditional
structure of the communal decision-making body at the village level was highly skewed in favor
of landed, high caste communities, who lived in neatly segregated areas within villages. As a
result, decisions such as investment in and location of the elementary school, health center,
crèche, internal road etc. mostly benefited the already well-endowed communities.
When the 73rd constitutional amendment act put in place representative bodies, with
reservations for women and scheduled castes and tribes, it was expected that the decisions of
panchayats would become more representative of the entire village community. But societal
changes take longer to come about. It has been the common experience in India that panchayats
continued to be dominated by influential upper-castes, even if elected representatives were from
reserved castes. More often than not, rules of quorum in panchayat meetings were not observed,
and decisions still taken by proxy votes. In such a scenario, panchayat attendance holds
significance. As the elected representatives from marginalized castes and communities gain
confidence to attend panchayat meetings and exercise their vote options with every successive
round of elections, the choices made by the panchayat could be expected to more closely reflect
the true choices of the entire community.
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) for instance, examined decision-making by women
sarpanches in rural India and found that women elected as leaders under the reservation policy
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invested more in the public goods more closely linked to women’s concerns – drinking water and
roads in West Bengal50 and drinking water in Rajasthan51. They invested less in public goods
that are more closely linked to men’s concerns – education in West Bengal and roads in
Rajasthan. The study concludes that leaders invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant
to the needs of their own genders. According to Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), it is because
the own preferences of women representatives are more aligned to the preferences of women in
the village, that they end up serving them better. It seems reasonable to extend this logic to the
elected leaders from other marginalized communities, the SCs and the STs. The decisions taken
by the elected leaders from these communities would probably be better aligned to the
preferences of their communities in the village.
Similarly, de Mello (2000, 2005) has examined the impact of decentralization on social
capital and concluded that bringing expenditure assignments closer to revenue sources
encourages political participation.
To see how participation in panchayat meetings is changing, one would ideally need data on
panchayat attendance over years. However, such data, though maintained at the panchayat level,
is not collected by the state. The 3rd SFC, for the first time collected data through detailed
questionnaires which, inter alia, also queried about panchayat attendance. Since we do not have
the luxury of a pre and post comparison, we carry out a cross-sectional analysis and control for
various other characteristics of panchayats to observe differences in attendance behaviors in
panchayats.

50 A populous state in eastern India, bordering Bangladesh; district headquarters are in Kolkatta.
51 A large state in Western India, comprising large tracts of the Thar Desert; district headquarters are in Jaipur.
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The results are presented in table IV-B. Attendance in panchayat meetings is positively
correlated with both the total untied revenues that a panchayat has, and with its own-source
revenues. Specifically, attendance in panchayat meetings has a correlation of 0.27 with total
revenue per capita, and 0.10 with own-source revenue per capita (both highly significant). It is
interesting to note that attendance is also positively correlated (with high significance) with our
decentralization indicator52 OR/TR. Therefore, panchayats having a high OR/TR ratio (and
higher attendance in panchayat meetings) could be expected to reflect popular choices more
faithfully.
The t-test, presented in table IV-C, also shows a significant difference in attendance in
panchayat meetings for panchayats which have tank and mineral revenues53 compared to those
which do not. As these revenues were assigned ‘randomly’ to panchayats, and as these revenues
are raised from local sources, the implication is that higher incidence of local taxation has
resulted in improvement in attendance in panchayats.

52 For this paper, we take the ratio of panchayat’s untied own-revenues (OR) to its untied total revenues (TR) as a
measure of the level of decentralization. Higher this ratio, the higher the level of decentralization.
53 Tank and Mineral revenues are untied sources of revenues transferred by the Government of Madhya Pradesh to
panchayats in 1997, to augment revenues of panchayats. A more detailed explanation on the significance of tank and
mineral revenues has been given in Chapter 5, section 5.1.
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Table IV-B: Correlation Coefficients
54
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|
OR/TR
ORpc
TRpc
SC %
ST %
Sarpanch
Attendance
|
Sex
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------OR/TR

|

1.0000

ORpc

|

0.7206*

TRpc

|

-0.0175

SC %

|

0.0099

-0.0125

ST %

|

-0.0453*

-0.0087

1.0000
0.2203*

1.0000
-0.0815*

1.0000

0.1037* -0.5792*

Sarpanch |
-0.0022
0.0056 -0.0088 -0.0332*
Sex
|
Attendance | 0.0581*
0.1028* 0.2666* -0.0556*
* implies significance at 1% level.

1.0000
0.0460*

1.0000

0.0749*

-0.0244

1.0000

Table IV-C: t test for attendance in panchayat meetings
Two-sample t test with equal variances
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Group |
Obs
Mean
Std. Err.
Std. Dev.
[95% Conf. Interval]
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------0 |
6142
.0081722
.0000744
.0058323
.0080263
.008318
1 |
1137
.0088758
.0001684
.0056782
.0085454
.0092062
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------combined |
7279
.0082821
.0000681
.0058137
.0081485
.0084156
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------diff |
-.0007036
.0001875
-.0010713
-.000336
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------diff = mean(0) - mean(1)
t = -3.7522
Ho: diff = 0
degrees of freedom =
7277
Ha: diff < 0
Ha: diff != 0
Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0001
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0002
Pr(T > t) = 0.9999
Group 0 panchayats do not have any revenues from tank and mineral sources, Group 1 panchayats do.

54 ORpc is untied own-revenues per capita of a panchayat
55 TRpc is untied total-revenues per capita of a panchayat
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We now examine expenditure patterns of panchayats. We have expenditure data for
panchayats in seven categories: expenditure on primary schools, street lights, roads and bridges,
internal roads and drains, sanitation, water, and administrative expenses. We compute the per
capita expenditures incurred on each category separately. We also calculate the fraction of total
expenditure incurred on each category and term this variable ‘percentage expenditure’ for that
category56.
Examining variations in ‘per capita expenditures’: We can examine how per capita
expenditures for each of these seven categories are affected by other economic and demographic
variables in our data set by running OLS regressions. First, we look at administrative expenses.
One might expect panchayats with access to larger revenue resources to have bigger
establishments. They would probably need more staff to collect revenue, maintain accounts and
so on, compared to panchayats with smaller resources. The state government bears the salary
expense of one panchayat secretary. Any additional staff has to be paid for by the panchayat
itself, from its own resources.
The results of OLS regressions of administrative expenses per capita are presented in
column 1, Table IV-D. The coefficient on both total revenues per capita and own source
revenues (as a fraction of total revenues) is positive and significant. This confirms our
expectation that panchayats that earn a higher fraction of their revenues from own sources incur
larger administrative expenses. There is a negative and significant coefficient on the area of the
panchayat. This is because geographically larger panchayats also have, on average, larger

56 Naturally, the sum of ‘percentage expenditures’ for all categories is 1.
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populations, and economies of scale allow them to have lower per capita administrative
expenses.
Panchayats with higher total revenues per capita spend significantly higher amounts on
primary schools. But the dependence of such expenditure on panchayat’s own-source revenues
(column (2), table IV-D) is not significant. From discussions held with panchayat leaders, it
appears that panchayats do spend higher amounts on maintenance of primary schools from
increased transfer grants. However, the preferences of the panchayat veer towards other items of
expenditure, such as street lights and village roads (column (3), and column (4), Table IV-D)
when the choice comes to deciding on expenditures from own-source revenues.
Panchayats with higher poverty levels and those which have tribal leaders spend more on
water. This may be so since these panchayats are typically remotely located and need to spend
more on ensuring availability of water.
Variation in ‘percentage expenditures’ with higher own-source revenues: Alternately,
we could see the variation in the pattern of panchayat expenditures in terms of percentages of
total expenditures. We first conduct a series of tests to check for differences in the percentage
expenditures on various categories between panchayats that have tank and mineral revenues and
those who do not.

The results, presented in Tables B1 to B7 in Appendix B, show that

percentage expenditures on water, on roads and bridges, and on street lights are significantly
higher for panchayats with tank and mineral revenues. There does not appear to be much of a
difference in the percentage expenditures between the two sets of panchayats on internal roads
and drains, and primary schools.
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As mentioned earlier, one can infer that people take more interest in attending panchayat
meetings when expenditures are to be incurred from own-source revenues. The expenditure
pattern, when attendance is high, is different, and probably more closely aligned to the
preferences of the voters.
We can also examine the variation in the ‘percentage expenditures’ for these seven
categories by running OLS regressions taking other economic and demographic variables as
regressors. The results are presented in Table IV-E. As a fraction of their total expenditures,
panchayats spend more on street lights, internal drains, roads and bridges, and water as their total
per capita revenues increase. The administrative expenses, as a fraction of total expenditures, go
down with increase in revenues. This again indicates economies of scale, with greater efficiency
in administrative expenses with larger size of revenues.
In addition, we find that an increase in the level of decentralization (OR/TR) is significantly
associated with an increase in percentage expenditure on street lights and on water, and with a
decrease in percentage expenditure on roads and bridges.
It appears from the discussions with panchayat leaders that as own-source revenues increase,
especially those from market fees, water fees for piped water supply, and minerals royalty,
residents demand better street-lighting and assured water on priority. Accordingly, the demand
for street lighting is usually higher in panchayats that have large local markets, or which are hubs
for local commerce.
Further, the expenditure on roads and bridges is typically capital intensive. The state
government provides 100% grants for construction of approach roads, including bridges, to
villages under a new scheme which was started in 1999. Local leaders lobby for these grants
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from the state as well as central governments. There is no program or scheme for provision of
100% grants for street lights or piped water supply. However, the state government off-sets a
portion of the expenditures incurred by panchayats on internal street lighting and water supply.
Thus, as own-source revenues rise, panchayats spend more on the latter.
To conclude, we find that a change in level of decentralization is significantly associated
with a change in some of the expenditure priorities of the panchayats. Whether seen in terms of
fraction of expenditures or in terms of per capita expenses, panchayats prefer to spend more on
localized goods when their revenues are from own-sources.
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Table IV-D: Regression Results for per capita expenditure
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Administrative
expenses per
capita

Expenditure
on primary
schools per
capita

Expenditure
on street
lights per
capita

Expenditure
on roads &
bridges per
capita

Expenditure
on internal
roads and
drains

Expenditure
on sanitation
per capita

Expenditure
on water
per capita

0.00573***
(0.000690)

0.0181***
(0.00400)

0.00393***
(0.00102)

0.0719***
(0.00534)

0.0116***
(0.00145)

0.00373***
(0.000702)

0.0373***
(0.00409)

OR/TR

30.01***
(9.077)

11.66
(24.18)

7.025**
(3.482)

-10.53
(21.52)

1.966
(4.832)

3.222
(3.349)

24.29
(20.44)

Panchayat sex
ratio

0.00763
(0.00812)

0.00911
(0.0269)

-0.00130
(0.0129)

-0.0165
(0.0311)

0.00203
(0.0107)

-0.00677
(0.00622)

-0.00570
(0.0199)

Literacy rate

-30.54**
(15.43)

-39.65
(51.89)

1.164
(6.972)

-2.378
(53.62)

10.66
(12.97)

-16.65
(21.31)

-55.01
(44.64)

Poverty level

-2.549
(3.059)

-59.10
(39.29)

-5.184
(8.182)

22.86
(27.47)

-3.387
(7.322)

-1.363
(3.361)

33.82*
(17.51)

SC population
(%)

-3.518
(2.166)

-20.88**
(9.724)

-0.882
(1.219)

-4.957
(13.90)

-1.094
(3.113)

-0.180
(1.702)

-13.85*
(8.399)

ST population
(%)

-0.993
(1.714)

-11.75
(7.724)

1.371
(1.785)

5.395
(6.262)

-0.895
(1.548)

-0.589
(1.228)

5.663
(4.775)

Sarpanch SC

0.233
(0.323)

1.371
(3.603)

0.275
(0.427)

1.594
(2.947)

0.271
(0.834)

-0.346
(0.347)

1.991
(2.247)

Sarpanch ST

-0.321
(0.253)

-0.308
(3.068)

0.0524
(0.559)

-2.396
(2.722)

0.0389
(0.706)

0.490
(0.416)

1.431
(2.274)

VARIABLES

Total Revenue
per capita
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Table IV-D: Regression Results for per capita expenditure
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Administrative
expenses per
capita

Expenditure
on primary
schools per
capita

Expenditure
on street
lights per
capita

Expenditure
on roads &
bridges per
capita

Expenditure
on internal
roads and
drains

Expenditure
on sanitation
per capita

Expenditure
on water
per capita

Literacy rate
(square)

33.63*
(17.28)

5.223
(50.82)

0.0469
(6.520)

2.472
(54.23)

0.0243
(15.18)

16.52
(20.94)

51.40
(45.66)

Poverty level
(square)

0.998
(2.463)

34.81
(30.90)

2.184
(5.649)

-22.59
(23.29)

3.213
(6.316)

0.0905
(2.877)

-34.77**
(14.65)

Total area of
panchayat

-0.00321***
(0.000265)

-0.00783***
(0.00214)

-0.000808**
(0.000397)

-0.0105***
(0.00172)

-0.00290***
(0.000393)

-0.00102***
(0.000217)

-0.00597***
(0.00114)

-1.392***
(0.227)

-3.530***
(0.892)

-0.161
(0.105)

-4.456***
(0.700)

-1.122***
(0.164)

-0.459***
(0.0948)

-2.999***
(0.468)

Constant

11.23
(7.804)

70.09**
(30.11)

4.116
(14.82)

45.30
(37.93)

5.344
(9.998)

14.37
(10.88)

37.01
(22.87)

Observations

13,876

13,876

13,876

13,876

13,876

13,876

13,876

R-squared

0.129

0.020

0.020

0.133

0.071

0.049

0.129

VARIABLES

Population
density

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table IV-E: Regression Results for per cent expenditure (fraction of total expenditure)

Variables

Total Revenue
per capita

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Percentage
expenditure on
administration

Percentage
expenditure
on primary
schools

Percentage
expenditure
on street light

Percentage
expenditure
on roads and
bridges

Percentage
Percentage
expenditure expenditure
on sanitation on water

-0.000128***

-8.61e-06

2.58e-06

8.57e-05***

Percentage
expenditure
on internal
drains and
lanes
8.75e-06**

(7.46e-06)

(5.85e-06)

(1.94e-06)

(7.65e-06)

0.0451

-0.0310

0.0526***

(0.0481)

(0.0329)

-8.33e-08

3.98e-05***

(4.37e-06)

(2.23e-06)

(6.08e-06)

-0.109***

-0.0383

0.0204

0.0606*

(0.0126)

(0.0372)

(0.0235)

(0.0135)

(0.0356)

OR/TR
Panchayat sex
ratio

-2.31e-05

-5.92e-05

4.21e-06

1.98e-05

4.06e-05

-2.01e-05

3.79e-05

(6.37e-05)

(4.65e-05)

(1.43e-05)

(5.10e-05)

(3.22e-05)

(1.67e-05)

(4.28e-05)

Literacy rate

-0.757***

0.0775

0.0757**

0.291***

0.118*

0.00164

0.193**

(0.147)

(0.0924)

(0.0318)

(0.106)

(0.0639)

(0.0378)

(0.0980)

-0.168**

-0.00456

0.0269

0.0826

0.0225

0.0188

0.0216

(0.0828)

(0.0597)

(0.0176)

(0.0677)

(0.0413)

(0.0212)

(0.0578)

Poverty level
SC population
(%)

0.0192

-0.0220

-0.00499

0.00653

0.0161

0.00721

-0.0221

(0.0325)

(0.0221)

(0.00789)

(0.0267)

(0.0176)

(0.00959)

(0.0218)

ST population

0.0181

0.00609

-0.00348

0.0125

-0.0289***

-6.18e-05

-0.00429
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Table IV-E: Regression Results for per cent expenditure (fraction of total expenditure)

Variables

(%)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Percentage
expenditure on
administration

Percentage
expenditure
on primary
schools

Percentage
expenditure
on street light

Percentage
expenditure
on roads and
bridges

Percentage
Percentage
expenditure expenditure
on sanitation on water

(0.0196)

(0.0137)

(0.00438)

(0.0163)

Percentage
expenditure
on internal
drains and
lanes
(0.00966)

-0.00468

0.000687

0.000589

-0.00112

(0.00986)

(0.00716)

(0.00250)

0.00412

-0.00677

(0.00937)

(0.00561)

(0.0136)

0.00202

-0.00188

0.00439

(0.00813)

(0.00571)

(0.00293)

(0.00676)

-0.00427*

0.00339

-0.00234

-0.000431

0.00630

(0.00675)

(0.00229)

(0.00835)

(0.00498)

(0.00264)

(0.00654)

-0.0182**

-0.00235

0.000962

0.00492

0.00721*

0.00279

0.00471

(0.00716)

(0.00518)

(0.00171)

(0.00604)

(0.00394)

(0.00217)

(0.00500)

Literacy rate
(square)

0.649***

-0.129

-0.0483

-0.269**

-0.00936

0.00402

-0.197*

(0.156)

(0.0977)

(0.0352)

(0.116)

(0.0738)

(0.0408)

(0.103)

Poverty level
(square)

0.163**

0.00638

-0.0307**

-0.0598

-0.0166

-0.0124

-0.0495

(0.0698)

(0.0499)

(0.0148)

(0.0565)

(0.0351)

(0.0186)

(0.0481)

-4.31e-05***

-7.34e-06

3.05e-06**

6.13e-06

4.24e-06

3.49e-06

3.35e-05***

(7.30e-06)

(5.15e-06)

(1.36e-06)

(5.58e-06)

(3.36e-06)

(2.42e-06)

(4.99e-06)

Sarpanch SC

Sarpanch ST

Sarpanch Sex

Total area of
panchayat

66

Table IV-E: Regression Results for per cent expenditure (fraction of total expenditure)

Variables

Population
Density

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Percentage
expenditure on
administration

Percentage
expenditure
on primary
schools

Percentage
expenditure
on street light

Percentage
expenditure
on roads and
bridges

Percentage
Percentage
expenditure expenditure
on sanitation on water

-0.0113***

0.000162

0.00212***

0.00128

Percentage
expenditure
on internal
drains and
lanes
0.00135

(0.00285)

(0.00203)

(0.000614)

(0.00205)

0.665***

0.203***

-0.0174

(0.0736)

(0.0519)

13,876

0.067

-5.04e-05

0.00648***

(0.00133)

(0.000633)

(0.00183)

0.0699

-0.00580

0.0371*

0.0479

(0.0175)

(0.0583)

(0.0355)

(0.0193)

(0.0496)

13,876

13,876

13,876

13,876

13,876

13,876

0.015

0.030

0.076

0.046

0.041

0.051

Constant

Observations

R-squared

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 5
Impact of Fiscal Decentralization in Rural India: A
case study

5.1 Introduction
Empirical evidence that links public expenditures to public outcomes at the local level,
especially in developing countries, is still limited. An empirical study by De Mello and
Barenstein (2001) uses cross-country data for 78 countries and finds that the relationship
between decentralization and governance depends on how sub-national expenditures are
financed. It concludes that the impact of sub-national revenue mobilization on governance
depends on the country’s level of decentralization.
In this chapter we use information derived from the fiscal dataset for panchayats
described in Chapter 4, about the impact of a policy change, a ‘natural experiment’ through
which a few tax resources were allocated to some panchayats, to get a better insight into the
issues related to fiscal decentralization in the context of a developing country like India. In
particular, we seek to answer the question whether village governments use own-source
revenues more efficiently than transfer grants to provide public services to their constituents.
As explained in Chapter 3, Madhya Pradesh was the first state in India to enact its own
legislation (Madhya Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1993) in accordance with the provisions of
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the Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 which mandated political and fiscal
decentralization. Elected bodies for self government were put in place at the village (gram
panchayat), block (janpad panchayat), and district (zila panchayat) level. Certain taxes and
fees were assigned under this Act to the three levels of panchayats to impart fiscal autonomy
to these bodies.
However, a major part of the finances required by the panchayats to meet their
development obligations still comes from transfers from the state and the central governments
as per the recommendations of the Central and the State Finance Commissions and as “tied”
funds for execution of certain projects/ development schemes. Most of the money transferred
from higher levels of government to panchayats is tied; that is, the end uses of the funds are
pre-determined. Even then, the untied funds transferred to panchayats are substantial in
comparison to their own sources of funding: according to the Report of Third State Finance
Commission, only 13.57% of total untied revenue accruing to panchayats in Madhya Pradesh
was from their own sources (Table III-I).
An important policy change in revenue assignment came about in 1997, whereby leaserevenues from minor mineral quarries57 and fishing tanks and ponds58 were transferred to
panchayats in whose geographical jurisdiction these natural resources were located. These
revenues were earlier being collected by the state government and then redistributed
according to a fixed formula to all panchayats in the state. The assignment of these taxes to
panchayats constituted a sort of ‘windfall’ for some panchayats, whose revenues from own
sources more than doubled.

57

A floor rate for royalty on minor minerals was fixed by the state government. Panchayats were free to auction
the mines on higher rates, through a process of transparent bidding. The mining inspector, a state employee, kept
tab on the quantity of minerals excavated.
58
Fishing ponds were similarly auctioned by panchayats to registered fishing cooperatives. The minimum lease
rent, depending on the size of the water body, was also fixed by the state government.
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It is also important to note that the assignment of these revenues to some panchayats
(1940 in our sample of 11687 panchayats) was ‘random’ in the sense that it was not related to
any specific attribute of the panchayats such as population, poverty level, etc. The state
government had been hitherto collecting revenues from these sources. It was felt that these
tanks and quarries would be better managed by the panchayats themselves, and shall
contribute to a significant source of revenues for them. Therefore, the responsibility of
collecting revenues from these sources- tanks and mineral quarries- were assigned to
panchayats59 as an important step towards fiscal decentralization by Madhya Pradesh.
Did this sudden increase in resources have any impact on the performance of
panchayats? Was there an improvement in provision of public services in these panchayats
which benefitted from this ‘windfall’ as compared to other panchayats which did not? Would
the same benefits have resulted had the State, instead of assigning these revenue sources to
panchayats, increased untied transfer grants to panchayats by an equivalent amount?
In this chapter, we seek an answer to these questions by examining some outcome
variables, such as female and male enrollment ratios60, derived from the village level survey
by the third State Finance Commission (SFC) of Madhya Pradesh, described in the previous
chapter. We check whether there is a relationship between higher own-source revenues and

59 Most of these tanks and quarries were allocated to gram panchayats. Some large tanks and quarries were
allocated to janpad and district panchayats.
60

Male/female enrollment ratio has been used as a measure of educational attainment or educational outcome in
a panchayat. The subject of school education is one of the responsibilities of the village panchayat. Therefore,
every panchayat is responsible for making efforts to make sure that every child of school-going age is enrolled
in a school. Under the leadership of the local panchayat, the schools also need to gather resources and teachers
need to work harder to make sure enrolled children (and their parents) are kept interested in continuing their
schooling. The enrollment ratios would be higher if the panchayats make and succeed in such efforts.
In order to effectively improve school enrollment, panchayats need resources - both monetary and human. In our
model, a panchayat is able to obtain funds through either assigned taxes and/or through transfer grants. Amongst
these two methods of fiscal decentralization, the method which, ceteris paribus, is associated with a higher
marginal impact of one additional Rupee available on the outcome variable (say, female enrollment ratio), is
considered more efficient.

70

the outcome variables, and if so, what could be the reasons behind this relationship. These
issues were also discussed with panchayat leaders in many villages to better understand the
results and corroborate the findings of this study.

5.2 Data Description
As detailed in Chapter 4 earlier, data collected by the 3rd SFC has been used to derive
panchayat-wise data on revenues, expenditures, and distances travelled to fetch water within
the panchayat. In addition, female and male enrollment ratios have also been constructed
from this data, for 11,687 panchayats.
Again, the socio-economic data used for the study is based on the 2001 census.
Variables such as sex ratio, proportion of Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Tribes (STs) in
population, and literacy level of women have been derived from the census. The census data
on agricultural laborers and casual laborers (as a proportion of total workforce) has been used
to construct a proxy for poverty level.

Table V-A: Descriptive statistics of additional variables used
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Female enrollment ratio

11687

0.199

0.0998

0.00095

0.5

Male enrollment ratio

11687

0.2408

0.110

0.00087

0.5

Table V-A above contains the data description of female enrollment ratio (girls enrolled
in schools as a fraction of the total population of women in the panchayat) and male
enrollment ratio (boys enrolled in schools as a fraction of the total population of men in the
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panchayat). These variables are constructed for each panchayat using the data collected by
the 3rd SFC61.
First we check if the outcome variable of our interest (in this case, female enrollment
ratio) is systematically different between the set of panchayats that have been bestowed with
tank and mineral (TM) revenues as compared to those that do not have these natural
resources (Table V-B). The difference-of-means t-statistic confirms that the two group means
are statistically different. Prima facie, it does appear that transfer of resources to panchayats
does result in more favorable outcomes.
Table V-B: Two-sample t-test (female enrollment ratio)
Group|
Obs
Mean
Std. Err.
Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------0
9747
.1985689
.0010066
.0993813
.1965957
.2005421
1
1940
.2036648
.002308
.1016548
.1991385
.2081911
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Combined
11687
.1994148
.0009229
.0997759
.1976057
.2012239
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Diff
-.0050959
.0024802
-.0099574
-.0002343
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------diff = mean(0) - mean(1)
t =
-2.0546
Ho: diff = 0
degrees of freedom =
11685
Ha: diff < 0
Ha: diff != 0
Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0200
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0399
Pr(T > t) = 0.9800
Note: Group 0 panchayats have no revenues from tank and mineral sources.

Since, by hypothesis, the allocation of these ‘additional’ resources to panchayats is
random, there could be a causal link between the observed higher female enrollment ratio in
panchayats that have tank and mineral revenues with the extra revenues made available to
them. If so, this would be purely an income effect. This would confirm that assignment of
additional revenue sources to panchayats is not detrimental to outcomes and that panchayats
have adequate absorptive capacity. However, a tax source assigned to panchayats is a tax
61 Ideally, we would have liked to construct female enrollment ratio as the ratio of girls enrolled in elementary
schools (Grade I to VIII) to the total number of girls in the relevant age group. However, census figures of age
distribution are available only upto the district level.
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source taken away from the state government. If additional resources are to be assigned to
panchayats, should this be done through tax assignment (as in the present case), or, through a
simple increase in transfer grants?
Therefore, the question remains whether the improvement shown by the set of
panchayats having the additional tank and mineral revenues is merely an income effect or
would there be positive externalities associated with the transfer of additional resources to
panchayats. In general, we ask the question whether the assignment of a revenue source is
more efficient than an outright equivalent transfer grant from higher levels of government.

5.3 Model Specification and Empirical Results
To understand and to empirically test the impact of decentralization on social and
economic outcomes measurable at local level, we construct a simple model as described
below:
Consider a state planner whose objective is to maximize the aggregate social or
economic outcome Es in the state. There are N panchayats in the state. The aggregate
outcome will depend upon the actual attained value

in panchayat i1…N. Further,
(0.1)

where wi is the weight assigned to the ith panchayat. At the panchayat level the
outcome

depends on the set of social, demographic and economic indicators

(the

structural features) for the panchayat, the total revenues Mi available to the panchayat, and the
impact of decentralization

(the programmatic feature).

Thus,
(0.2)
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5.4 Measuring the Impact of Decentralization: Specification 1
The impact of decentralization,

on the outcome variable

We could write the functional form of this impact

is not directly observable.

in various ways. For example, one

specification common in economic literature62 is

, where the impact of

decentralization could be measured as a function of the ratio of own-source revenues OR to
total revenues TR of the panchayat.
There are three distinct components of the variable TR mentioned above. First, untied
transfer grants63 received from higher levels of government (state/centre). Second, revenues
(taxes/fees) collected by a panchayat exercising the powers of taxation assigned to it by the
state/centre. Third, resources obtained by the panchayat as loans from higher levels of
government and/or from financial institutions. The second component represents fiscal
decentralization through assignment of tax base. The first component represents fiscal
decentralization through transfer grants.
We can then, specify the empirical regression equation as follows:
(0.3)
where

is the outcome variable for the ith panchayat,

is the vector of the panchayat –

specific economic, social and demographic indicators (for example, poverty level, literacy
rate, sex ratio, etc.), TR is the per capita total funding (revenues) available to panchayat. As
stated above, TR includes (in per capita terms) revenues from its own-sources (called OR),
62 This has been used, for instance, by de Mello and Barenstein (2001). Ebel and Yilmaz (2003) have reviewed
empirical literature on impact of fiscal decentralization on macro indicators and observed that most studies use
Government Finance Statistics of the International Monetary Fund and describe the degree of fiscal
decentralization as the subnational share of total government spending / revenue or of the Gross Domestic
Product. They propose that revenue autonomy of subnational government is a better measure of fiscal
decentralization.
63 Though data is available for tied funds as well, these have been excluded, since they do not reflect spending
decision of the local panchayat.
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untied transfer grants from the higher level of governments, and loans taken from other
sources64.

The ratio
fixed effects, and

measures the level of fiscal decentralization,

measures the (district)

is the error term in the regression equation.

The regression coefficient β2 is likely to be positive. This represents a pure income
effect. However, the empirical question about the sign of the regression coefficient β3 is open.
If higher values of the outcome variable

are desirable, then a negative value for β3 implies

that higher levels of decentralization are associated with a deterioration of the outcome
variable.
This negative impact on outcomes could result from lack of administrative capacities at
the lower tiers of government, or capture of government by local elite (Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2000), higher corruption (Treisman, 2002), or fiscal irresponsibility on the part
of the subnational governments if they do not have hard budget constraints and central
governments are prone to giving easy bailouts (Goodspeed, 2002).
Further, the relationship between decentralization and governance may also depend on
how sub-national expenditures are financed and on the country’s level of decentralization (de
Mello and Barenstein, 2001).
Lemma 1. If in the empirical regression equation (0.3) the estimated value of β3 >0 then
fiscal decentralization through assignment of tax base is empirically more effective than
through transfer grants.

64 Loans taken by Panchayats are very limited. In Madhya Pradesh, specifically, panchayats have to seek prior
approval of the notified competent authority to raise resources by way of loans. Scarcely any panchayat has
availed of this source of funding. Thus, panchayats have a hard budget constraint. They have to limit
expenditures within current revenues.
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If the state/central government steps up transfer grants to panchayats, which increases
panchayat (per capita) revenues by Rupees 1, then only TR increases by Rupee 1, thus
increasing the value of the outcome variable by

. If however, panchayat (per-

capita) revenues increase by Rupee 1 because of increased collection of local taxes and fees
(by way of decentralization through tax assignment), then both the variables TR and OR
increase by Rupee 1, thus increasing the value of outcome variable by
.

5.5 Empirical Testing of the Model
We first test our model with female enrollment ratio in the panchayat as the dependent
variable. We regress this variable, using an OLS model (equation 0.3), on panchayat per
capita untied revenue (from all sources) TR, literacy level of the panchayat, poverty index
and our indicator of fiscal decentralization, namely the ratio of panchayat’s own source
revenue to total revenue (OR/TR). We also include quadratic terms for literacy rate and
poverty levels, to examine the behavior of the dependant variable in more detail.
The regression results are presented in Table V-C65. We get a positive coefficient (

)

for the indicator of fiscal decentralization, strongly suggesting that decentralization improves
female enrollment ratio. Similarly, the coefficient

of the panchayat revenue variable (TR)

is positive.
Since we have included quadratic terms for literacy and poverty levels (literacy rate
square and poverty level square), the effect on the outcome variable (female enrollment ratio)
of a change in explanatory variable can be estimated as

65

Since the data for some panchayats is available for one year, and for some others for two years (in which case
the average for the two years is used), we use robust standard errors to address possible issues related to
heteroscedasticity.
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where X = Literacy rate or poverty level; and b1 and b2 are the estimated coefficient of X and
X2 in the regression equation.
In our regression below,

which is positive for
a value of poverty level below 0.74 (the mean poverty level is 0.59: Table IV-A).
The above result indicates that at lower poverty levels, an increase in poverty is
associated with increased enrollment of girls in elementary schools, probably due to the hotcooked meals and free uniforms provided in schools. However, as the poverty level increases
(above 0.74), any further increase in poverty level is now associated with a decrease in
female enrollments. This may be because families in extreme poverty withdraw children from
school to help in earning wages66.
Similarly, the result for changes in literacy level is:

which is positive for a
value of literacy rate below 0.3 (the mean value of literacy rate is 0.47).
This result is harder to understand than the earlier result regarding poverty level. Why
should female enrollment ratio decrease as literacy rate increases above a certain level? This
researcher discussed the issue with local leaders and some families in rural villages. One
explanation could be that higher literacy levels are typically seen in villages close to urban
areas, and many educated families enroll their children, both girls and boys, in private
schools in nearby urban centers. We do not have data on proximity to towns and cities to test
this further.
66

The results are consistent when checked for male enrollment ratios (Appendix C). Male enrollment also
declines in the face of extreme poverty.
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Further, we would also expect that the villages which have a higher population of
Scheduled Tribes would have a higher proportion of girls enrolled in schools, since the tribal
populations in Madhya Pradesh exhibit better gender equality indices.
We may also expect higher female enrollment in panchayats that have a woman as a
sarpanch, since a woman sarpanch may exert her influence in persuading families to send
their girls to school and providing better facilities for the girl child in schools. For instance,
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) have found that representation of women has important
effects on policy decisions in local government. Their study finds more investment in water
where the Sarpanch is a woman, and better location of amenities in SC hamlets, and
concludes that leaders invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of
their own gender.
We add caste composition of the panchayat and caste and sex of the sarpanch to the
second regression (Table V-C, column 2). Our results do not change. Both β2 and β3 remain
positive and significant. Further, the coefficient on Scheduled Tribes dominated panchayats is
also positive and significant. This is a probable indication of better responsiveness towards
girls’ education in tribal villages. Interestingly, and contrary to what was expected, we find
that while the coefficient on ‘sarpanch sex’ is positive, it is not significant.
Focus group discussion with panchayat leaders suggest that women leaders have been in
place only for a few years, since the constitutional amendment provided for reservations. The
true impact of their decision-making shall be evident after these women leaders have been in
office for some more time and have learnt how to exert their influence in a hitherto maledominated decision making process.
A large number of households in Madhya Pradesh are deficient in water. If water for
domestic use needs to be fetched from a greater distance, it could be the case that the girl
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child is held back from attending school. We also add dummies for the distance travelled to
fetch water in the third regression (Table V-C, column 3). Our results do not change. Both β2
and β3 remain positive and significant67. However, distance travelled to fetch water does not
have any significant coefficients.
All three regressions yield negative and significant coefficient on the total area variable.
This suggests that in rural areas, panchayats spread out over large areas may not have easily
accessible schools, thus leading to low enrollment of girls.
Following Lemma 1, our results are an indication that fiscal decentralization through
assignment of taxes is more effective in achieving desired outcomes.

67

We also check whether β3 > β2. In regression (2) of Table V-C, the t-value associated with the test β3 – β2=0 is
2.24. Thus, we can reject the null that β3 = β2. On a one-sided test, we can safely conclude that β3 > β2. This is
also true for other regressions in this specification.

79

Table V-C: OLS Regression: Specification 1 (Equation 0.3)
Female enrollment ratio
(1)

(2)

(3)

4.54e-05***
(3.00e-06)

4.45e-05***
(3.03e-06)

4.45e-05***
(3.03e-06)

0.0260*
(0.0136)

0.0302**
(0.0136)

0.0304**
(0.0136)

-7.23e-06
(1.91e-05)

-4.28e-05**
(1.94e-05)

-4.26e-05**
(1.94e-05)

Literacy rate

0.163***
(0.0377)

0.264***
(0.0390)

0.265***
(0.0390)

Literacy rate (square)

-0.274***
(0.0411)

-0.331***
(0.0414)

-0.332***
(0.0415)

Poverty level

0.0571***
(0.0219)

0.0712***
(0.0219)

0.0708***
(0.0218)

Poverty level (square)

-0.0385**
(0.0185)

-0.0488***
(0.0185)

-0.0484***
(0.0185)

Total Revenue (TR) per capita
Own Source Revenue/TR
Panchayat sex ratio

Expenditure on primary school
(per capita)

3.26e-07
(9.35e-07)

SC percent

-0.0101
(0.00899)

-0.0100
(0.00899)

ST percent

0.0512***
(0.00551)

0.0511***
(0.00551)

Sarpanch SC

-0.000567
(0.00247)

-0.000529
(0.00247)

Sarpanch ST

-0.00422*
(0.00250)

-0.00421*
(0.00250)

Sarpanch Sex

0.000163
(0.00183)

0.000137
(0.00183)

Distance travelled to fetch
water (201m to 500m)

-0.000296
(0.00298)

Distance travelled to fetch
water (501m to 1000m)

0.00244
(0.00274)

Distance travelled to fetch
water (1001m to 2000m)

0.00228
(0.00388)

Distance travelled to fetch
water (above 2000m)

-0.000712
(0.00241)
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Female enrollment ratio
(1)

(2)

(3)

Table continued on next page
Total area of panchayat

-2.50e-05***
(1.89e-06)

-2.75e-05***
(1.91e-06)

0.180***
(0.0215)

0.167***
(0.0215)

Constant
Observations

11687

R-squared

0.262

11680

-2.75e-05***
(1.91e-06)
0.166***
(0.0215)
11680

0.270

0.270

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; District fixed effects suppressed

What do the above empirical results say about the extent to which tax assignment is
better than transfer grants?
Table V-D: Descriptive statistics of variables for calculation of difference in impacts
Variable
OR pc / TR
1/TR pc

2

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

11687

.0002066

.0023635

0

.1759084

11687

.012471

.4478845

.0003341

39.29412

For an ‘average’ panchayat, if assignment of taxes increases per capita panchayat
revenues by one rupee, then its impact on the female enrollment ratio equals
= 0.000418. If transfer grants increase per capita panchayat revenues by
one rupee, its impact on female enrollment ratio equals

= 0.0000382.

Therefore, it can be argued that insofar as we are concerned with improving female
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enrollment ratios, the empirical results suggest that tax assignment is ten times as effective as
simple transfer of grants68.

5.6 Do hidden ‘ability’ factors affect our estimates?
Model 1 above supports the case that greater decentralization and fiscal autonomy for
panchayats leads to greater changes in social outcomes. Prima facie, a panchayat which is
able to raise higher revenues from its own sources as a proportion of its total revenues is
likely to be able to more effectively manage its resources. Taking the ratio of panchayat
revenues from own sources to total revenues as a measure of fiscal decentralization, we found
evidence in support of our contention that panchayats with better revenue autonomy have
better female enrollment ratios. Our results indicate that fiscal decentralization through
assignment of tax base is more effective in achieving desired social outcomes.
However, two questions are pertinent here. First, it may be argued that there are some
unobservable factors that influence both the social indicators as well as the revenues collected
by panchayats and which may not be fully captured by the socio-economic variables included
in the structural vector

. For instance, if the village leadership is educated69 and

progressive, they might exert influence by encouraging families to send girls to school. They
may also be putting in extra efforts to raise taxes. Therefore, the hidden ‘ability’ factors could
potentially contaminate our results and one could question whether the empirical deduction
about the relative effectiveness of the two forms of decentralization (transfer grants vis-à-vis
tax assignment) is valid in view of the possibility of involvement of ‘ability’ factors when we

68 The empirical measure of the relative advantage of fiscal decentralization through assignment of revenue
base is indeed dependant on the particular controls used. However, the finding that the assignment of taxes is
‘superior’ to transfer grants appears quite robust.
69 While we have a control for the literacy level of the village, we do not have data on variables representing
the ability of the Panchayat leadership.
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proxy level of decentralization by the variable

. We should try to isolate the potential

influence of hidden ability factors on our results.
Second, even if there were no hidden ability factors involved in our measure of the
decentralization variable, coefficient β3 of the decentralization variable may not provide a
good estimate of the marginal impact of additional tax-revenues being made available to a
panchayat, since this coefficient measures the average of marginal impact across all
panchayats.
In other words, the marginal impact of an increase in own source panchayat revenues
may be different from the average impact indicated by the regression coefficients. As
panchayats gain more autonomy, political and fiscal, their capacity for delivery of services
could increase and the marginal impact may be greater than the average impact. On the other
hand, if fiscal autonomy of panchayats is provided in an environment characterized by high
levels of corruption or capture by local elite, or higher administrative costs, the marginal
impact could be lower than the average impact, and may even be negative.
To resolve these questions, we could use the policy change of 1997, whereby leaserevenues from minor mineral quarries and fishing tanks and ponds were assigned to
panchayats. This constituted a ‘windfall’ revenue for some panchayats, whose revenues from
own sources (on an average) more than doubled. These additional revenues were ‘random’ in
the sense that they did not depend upon the ‘ability’ of panchayat leaders, but only on the
geographical accident of occurrence of a natural resource in a panchayat. We could use this
‘windfall’ allocation of tank-mineral (TMR) revenues as a natural experiment to construct an
alternate indicator of the level of decentralization.
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We now take the ratio of revenues from tanks and minerals to total revenues (i.e.
TMR/TR) as a proxy for the extent of decentralization. We could then specify the empirical
regression equation as follows:

(0.4)

5.6.1 Empirical results
We test the model equation (0.4), using an OLS regression model. The results are
presented in Table V-E. The regressions show that the coefficient on the Total Revenue per
capita variable remains positive and significant. The coefficients of literacy rate and poverty
level also remain positive and significant as earlier. The coefficient on total area of panchayat
is negative and significant: an indication of barriers to access in panchayats spread out over
large areas. The expenditure on primary schools per capita has a positive coefficient, but is
not significant. This is probably due to the fact that most capital expenditure on schools
comes from the state and central budgets. Panchayats have supervisory oversight function
over schools and carry out only minor repair and maintenance expenditures. The coefficient
on TM revenues is positive but not significant in the first regression. The coefficient on the
dummy for panchayats having TM revenues is also not significant in the second regression.
We now introduce a dummy for panchayats which have a significant source of ownrevenues coming from tanks and minerals (more than 20%). We find a positive coefficient on
this dummy variable in the third regression; and positive and significant coefficient on this
dummy in the fourth regression within the group of panchayats that have TM revenues.
Evidently, tank and mineral revenues must comprise a large proportion of total revenues to
have a significant impact on female enrollments.
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Table V-E: OLS Regression: Specification 1 (Equation 0.4)
Female enrollment ratio

Total Revenue (TR) per capita
Tank and mineral revenue
(TMR)/TR

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

4.44e-05***
(3.03e-06)

4.46e-05***
(3.03e-06)

4.43e-05***
(3.03e-06)

3.96e-05***
(7.97e-06)

0.0196
(0.0130)

0.0225*
(0.0135)

0.0282
(0.0315)
-0.000843
(0.00235)

Dummy_TMR [0,1]
Dummy_TMR/TR> 20% [0,1]
-4.28e-05**
(1.94e-05)

-4.24e-05**
(1.94e-05)

-4.28e-05**
(1.94e-05)

-4.54e-05
(4.87e-05)

Literacy rate

0.263***
(0.0390)

0.265***
(0.0391)

0.264***
(0.0391)

0.296***
(0.112)

Literacy rate (square)

-0.329***
(0.0415)

-0.331***
(0.0415)

-0.330***
(0.0415)

-0.340***
(0.115)

Poverty level

0.0708***
(0.0219)

0.0704***
(0.0219)

0.0703***
(0.0219)

-0.00294
(0.0521)

Poverty level (square)

-0.0486***
(0.0185)

-0.0483***
(0.0185)

-0.0482***
(0.0185)

0.0324
(0.0461)

3.23e-07
(9.37e-07)

3.21e-07
(9.35e-07)

6.60e-07
(7.70e-07)

Panchayat sex ratio

Expenditure on primary school
(per capita)
SC percent

-0.0102
(0.00900)

-0.0101
(0.00900)

-0.0102
(0.00900)

-0.0261
(0.0234)

ST percent

0.0510***
(0.00552)

0.0508***
(0.00552)

0.0509***
(0.00552)

0.0609***
(0.0146)

Sarpanch SC

-0.000521
(0.00247)

-0.000461
(0.00247)

-0.000485
(0.00247)

0.00533
(0.00616)

Sarpanch ST

-0.00423*
(0.00250)

-0.00422*
(0.00250)

-0.00420*
(0.00250)

0.00161
(0.00575)

Sarpanch Sex

0.000132
(0.00183)

0.000109
(0.00183)

0.000126
(0.00183)

0.000401
(0.00444)

-2.75e-05***
(1.91e-06)

-2.75e-05***
(1.91e-06)

-2.75e-05***
(1.91e-06)

-2.72e-05***
(4.85e-06)

0.168***
(0.0215)

0.167***
(0.0215)

0.167***
(0.0215)

0.171***
(0.0585)

Total area of panchayat
Constant
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Female enrollment ratio
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Observations

11680

11680

11680

1940

R-squared

0.270

0.270

0.270

0.318

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; district fixed effects suppressed; distance
travelled to fetch water suppressed.

Another way to explore the possible endogeneity is to use TMR/TR as an instrument for
OR/TR and carry out a two-stage least squares regression (2SLS). We conduct an
instrumental variables regression70 for regression (3) of specification 1, equation 0.3 (Table
V-C), and test for endogeneity. Results show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
there is no endogeneity71. In this case, our ordinary least square estimate is consistent and is
more efficient.
Introducing a further disaggregation, the empirical regression equation can now be
specified as follows:

(0.5)
Here, we disaggregate own source revenue further into revenue from own sources
other than TM revenue, and TM revenue. The following then holds for equation (0.5):
Lemma 2. If

>

then decentralization through assignment of tax-base is more cost-

effective than decentralization through transfer-grants.
If transfer grants from state/central government increase panchayat (percapita) revenues
by Rupees 1, then TR increases by Rupees 1, thus increasing the value of the outcome
70 ivreg2 in STATA with endogeneity testing option gives a χ2 value for the statistic as 0.015, and a p-value of
0.9028.
71 We also test for endogeneity of TR and OR, with TMR and TMR2 as instruments, but do not find it: Please
see discussion following Table V-H.
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variable by approximately [

]. If assignment of revenue source

increases TMR (per capita) by Rupee 1, then both TR and TMR increase by Rupee 1, thus
increasing the value of outcome variable by approximately
+

.

We run the regression on this model and present the results in Table V-F. All our
previous results hold. Here, the coefficient on own-source revenues net of TM revenues is
positive and significant. The coefficient on the dummy for panchayats having TM revenues is
not significant in the second regression.
The coefficient on the dummy for panchayats which have a significant source of ownrevenues coming from tanks and minerals (more than 20%) is positive in the third regression;
and positive and significant in the fourth regression within the group of panchayats that have
TM revenues.
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Table V-F, OLS Regression: Specification 1 (Equation 0.5)

(1)
Total Revenue (TR) per
4.45e-05***
capita
(3.03e-06)
Own Revenue minus tank- 0.0313**
mineral revenue/TR
(0.0152)
Tank and mineral revenue 0.0270
(TMR)/TR
(0.0315)
Dummy_TMR [0,1]
Dummy_TMR/TR>20%
[0,1]
Panchayat sex ratio
Literacy rate
Literacy rate (square)
Poverty level
Poverty level (square)
Expenditure on primary
school (per capita)
SC percent

-4.28e-05**
(1.94e-05)
0.264***
(0.0390)
-0.331***
(0.0414)
0.0712***
(0.0219)
-0.0488***
(0.0185)

Observations

-0.0101
(0.00899)
0.0512***
(0.00551)
-0.000567
(0.00247)
-0.00422*
(0.00250)
0.000165
(0.00183)
-2.75e-05***
(1.91e-06)
0.167***
(0.0215)
11680

R-squared

0.270

ST percent
Sarpanch SC
Sarpanch ST
Sarpanch Sex
Total area of panchayat
Constant

Female enrollment ratio
(2)
(3)
4.47e-05***
4.44e-05***
(3.03e-06)
(3.03e-06)
0.0325**
0.0320**
(0.0152)
(0.0152)

(4)
3.97e-05***
(7.97e-06)
0.0185
(0.0331)

-0.00122
(0.00235)

-4.23e-05**
(1.94e-05)
0.266***
(0.0390)
-0.333***
(0.0415)
0.0708***
(0.0219)
-0.0485***
(0.0185)
3.35e-07
(9.38e-07)
-0.0100
(0.00900)
0.0509***
(0.00552)
-0.000499
(0.00247)
-0.00421*
(0.00250)
0.000141
(0.00183)
-2.74e-05***
(1.91e-06)
0.166***
(0.0215)
11680
0.270

0.0197
(0.0130)
-4.28e-05**
(1.94e-05)
0.266***
(0.0391)
-0.332***
(0.0415)
0.0707***
(0.0219)
-0.0484***
(0.0185)
3.31e-07
(9.36e-07)
-0.0101
(0.00899)
0.0511***
(0.00551)
-0.000529
(0.00247)
-0.00419*
(0.00250)
0.000158
(0.00183)
-2.75e-5***
(1.91e-06)
0.166***
(0.0215)
11,680
0.270

0.0228*
(0.0135)
-4.55e-05
(4.87e-05)
0.297***
(0.112)
-0.342***
(0.115)
-0.00282
(0.0521)
0.0323
(0.0461)
6.69e-07
(7.71e-07)
-0.0262
(0.0234)
0.0611***
(0.0146)
0.00539
(0.00615)
0.00170
(0.00575)
0.000422
(0.00444)
-2.72e-05***
(4.85e-06)
0.170***
(0.0586)
1,940
0.318

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; district fixed effects suppressed,
distance travelled to fetch water suppressed.

88

5.7 Measuring the impact of decentralization: Specification 2
We could alternatively, think of the process of decentralization as one that impacts the
capacity of the panchayat to bring about change. Therefore, the impact of decentralization
could be modeled as a variable that proxies for the capacity of the panchayat to utilize the
funds available with it. This capacity variable may depend upon the level of the total
revenues, Mi, available with the panchayat, and other structural parameters,
panchayat72. In other words,

, of the

. Therefore:

(0.6)
Assuming that the functions g (·) and

(·) in the objective function in equation (0.6) are

continuous and twice differentiable, the total impact of higher resource availability to the
panchayat can be written as a sum of two components:

(0.7)
The first component

measures the direct impact of an increase in resources of the ith

panchayat on the outcome variable. This is likely to be positive, as allocation of scarce
resources enables the panchayat to take up activities which it couldn’t do earlier. Further,
existing programs can be expanded, and more people can be benefited.

Considering the second component, the factor

is likely to be positive, as

(·)

represents efficiency of resource use, and higher efficiency is expected to lead to better

72 A similar model has been used to measure the impact of decentralization on health outcomes (specifically the
infant mortality rate) in India by Asfaw et al (2004). Their study examines expected health outcomes of fiscal
decentralization in India. Using state-level data on infant mortality rates, they examine whether increasing fiscal
decentralization affects rural infant mortality rates irrespective of the level of political decentralization. They
conclude that States which have performed better in the average annual growth rate of fiscal decentralization
indicators have also performed better in the reduction of rural infant mortality rate.
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outcomes. However, the factor

may not be positive as it depends on social and

institutional arrangements. As discussed earlier, in case the institutional capacity is degraded
- say in a panchayat with high levels of corruption - higher allocation may lead to a lower
efficiency of resource use. Therefore, in theory, the overall impact of fiscal decentralization
may be ambiguous.
The outcome function

in equation (0.6), after dropping subscripts, can be linearized

around a point M0 as:
E = E (M0) + E’ (M0) (M −M0) + higher order terms

=
=

where,

(0.8)

represents the direct impact of fiscal decentralization in the form of higher

allocations on the outcome for the panchayat, and C is a variable representing the institutional
capacity to increase efficiency of resource use with increased fiscal decentralization.
Based on the above theoretical model, the empirical regression model can be specified
as:

(0.9)

where Ei is the outcome variable for the ith panchayat,

is the vector of the panchayat –

specific economic and social indicators (for example, literacy rate, poverty level etc.), as
earlier, TR is the total revenue (per capita) available to the panchayat from various sources,
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pancap is the indicator for the institutional capacity of the panchayat,
effects, and

is the (district) fixed

is the error in the regression equation.

Capacity of panchayat is not easy to measure. We could think of the ratio of the
panchayat’s own revenues to total revenues (i.e. OR/TR) as a candidate for proxying the
institutional capacity of the panchayat. Ceteris paribus, a democratically elected panchayat
that is able to generate a higher proportion of its total revenues from taxing its own
population is likely to have higher institutional capacity for effective management of
resources available to the panchayat. Therefore, the regression equation (0.9) could be
simplified as:

(0.10)

The regression coefficient

is likely to be positive. This is purely an income effect.

However, the empirical question about the sign of the regression coefficient
If higher values of the outcome variable

is open.

are desirable, then a negative coefficient implies

that higher revenues lead to erosion in the panchayat’s ability to obtain desirable outcomes
(same as in specification 1).
Lemma 3. If

>0 then fiscal decentralization through assignment of taxes is more

effective than through transfer grants.
If collection of local taxes and fees (decentralization through assignment) increases
panchayat (per-capita) revenues by Rupee 1, then both the variables TR and OR increase by
Rupee 1, thus increasing the value of outcome variable by

. On the other hand, if the

state/central government steps up transfer grants to panchayats which increases panchayat
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(per capita) revenue by Rupee 1, then only the variable TR increases by Rupee 1, thus
increasing the value of the outcome variable by
We use this model to test whether the data supports our hypothesis.
Table V-G presents the results of the OLS regressions taking female enrollment ratio as
the dependent variable. The regressions presented in column 1 -3 yield significant
coefficients on Total Revenue per capita as well as on own- source revenue per capita. We
continue to get positive and significant relationship between our dependent variable and
literacy rates and percentage of scheduled tribes in the population. As in specification 1
above (table V-C), we again find an inverse relationship between total area of the panchayat
and female enrollment, which may be a possible indication of access barriers.
According to our data, if transfer grants from state/central government increase
panchayat (percapita) revenues by Rupee 1, then TR increases by Rupee 1, thus increasing
the value of the outcome variable by

= 0.0000424. If assignment of revenue source

increases OR (per capita) by Rupee 1, then both TR and OR increase by Rupee 1, thus
increasing the value of outcome variable by approximately

= 0.000125. Therefore,

fiscal decentralization through assignment of tax is empirically three times as effective as
fiscal decentralization through transfer grants.
We can also estimate the elasticity of our variable of interest, female enrollment ratio (FER)
with respect to changes in total revenues and own revenues- (d(FER)/d(TR) * TR/FER and
d(FER)/d(OR) * OR/FER) - to get an idea about their relative values.
Using coefficients estimated in Table V_G (eqn 0.10), the elasticities can be estimated as
follows:

ɛTR=d(FER)/d(TR) * TR/FER = β2 * TR/FER = 4.24e-05 * 351.65 / 0.199 = 7.49e-02
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ɛOR=d(FER)/d(OR) * OR/FER = (β2 + β3) * OR/FER = (4.24e-05 + 8.26e-05) * 9.176 / 0.199
= 5.76e-03
The change in FER for a one rupee increase in TR per capita can be estimated as:
ΔFER = ɛTR *FER*(ΔTR/TR) = β2 * ΔTR =4.24e-05

The change in FER for a one rupee increase in OR per capita can be estimated as:
ΔFER = ɛOR *FER*(ΔOR/OR) = (β2 + β3)* ΔOR =1.25e-04

Therefore, fiscal decentralization through assignment of taxes is three times more
effective than through transfer grants.
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Table V-G: OLS Regression: Specification 2 (Equation 0.10)
Female enrollment ratio
(1)
4.34e-05***
(3.08e-06)

(2)
4.23e-05***
(3.10e-06)

(3)
4.24e-05***
(3.11e-06)

Own Source revenue per capita

7.82e-05***
(2.64e-05)

8.25e-05***
(2.65e-05)

8.26e-05***
(2.65e-05)

Panchayat sex ratio

-7.84e-06
(1.91e-05)

-4.34e-05**
(1.94e-05)

-4.32e-05**
(1.94e-05)

Literacy rate

0.163***
(0.0376)

0.264***
(0.0389)

0.266***
(0.0390)

Literacy rate (square)

-0.275***
(0.0410)

-0.331***
(0.0414)

-0.332***
(0.0414)

Poverty level

0.0572***
(0.0219)

0.0713***
(0.0218)

0.0709***
(0.0218)

Poverty level (square)

-0.0387**
(0.0185)

-0.0490***
(0.0185)

-0.0486***
(0.0185)

Total Revenue per capita

Expenditure on primary schools,
per capita

3.26e-07
(9.33e-07)

SC percent

-0.0103
(0.00899)

-0.0102
(0.00899)

ST percent

0.0511***
(0.00551)

0.0510***
(0.00551)

Sarpanch SC

-0.000615
(0.00247)

-0.000578
(0.00247)

Sarpanch ST

-0.00427*
(0.00250)

-0.00426*
(0.00250)

Sarpanch Sex

0.000118
(0.00183)

9.19e-05
(0.00183)

Distance travelled to fetch water
(201m to 500m)

-0.000362
(0.00298)

Distance travelled to fetch water
(501m to 1000m)

0.00235
(0.00274)

Distance travelled to fetch water
(1001m to 2000m)

0.00237
(0.00389)

Distance travelled to fetch water
(above 2001m)

-0.000697
(0.00241)
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Female enrollment ratio
(1)
-2.50e-05***
(1.89e-06)

(2)
-2.74e-05***
(1.91e-06)

(3)
-2.74e-05***
(1.91e-06)

Constant

0.182***
(0.0214)

0.168***
(0.0215)

0.167***
(0.0215)

Observations

11687

11680

11680

R-squared

0.262

0.270

0.270

Total area of panchayat

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Let us consider the following specification again:

(0.9)

As pointed out earlier, in the model for specification 1, a potential problem with the
specification is that ability factors ought to be represented in the vector of variables

, but we

do not have data about innate ability of panchayats that may influence outcomes directly.
Further, ‘TR’ (total panchayat revenue) equals own-source revenues and untied transfer
grants. A devolution formula using an index based on population, area and backwardness73
determines the amounts of transfer grants to different panchayats. However, panchayat’s
ability factors could, in theory, possibly exert some influence on the collection of own-source
revenues. It follows then, that the variable pancap * TR could also depend on panchayat
ability.
Therefore, there is sufficient reason to suspect that the variables TR and pancap* TR
may be endogenous, and the corresponding parameter estimates may be biased. If this is true,

73 The thirteenth Finance Commission has advocated a system where transfers are partially dependent on the
tax-effort of the panchayats. This has not yet taken effect.
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we cannot draw reliable conclusions about the relative efficacy of the two forms of fiscal
decentralization.
We repeat the use of the random assignment of tank and mineral revenues to panchayats
to construct instruments for the two variables - TR and pancap * TR - under suspicion for
endogeneity. Panchayats have received tank and mineral revenues in a random fashion,
unrelated to any performance parameter or any intrinsic ability. We check that revenue from
tanks and minerals is uncorrelated with structural attributes of the panchayat such as literacy,
poverty level, SC (scheduled caste) and ST (scheduled tribe) population (Table V-H). The
results show that TM revenue is correlated, albeit with a low correlation coefficient, with
panchayat population – this can either be due to the fact that panchayats which have a larger
population are likely to be spread over a larger geographical area, or that locations with a
large water source are likely to have a larger population. TM revenue is also positively
correlated with the area of the panchayat. This can be attributed to the fact that the probability
of finding tanks and minor minerals and the likely revenues from these sources is higher for
panchayats spread over larger areas. In particular, this step to assign these revenue-sources to
panchayats was not driven by any influence-group or lobbies. We can thus, safely conclude
that this policy change is exogenous, and not influenced by any other factors such as wealth
or ability of those with minerals.
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Table V-H: Checking for random assignment of tank and mineral revenues (correlation
coefficients)
Revenue
from
tanks &
minerals
Revenue from
tanks &
minerals
Panchayat
population
Literacy
rate
Panchayat
sex ratio
SC
percentage
ST
percentage
Poverty
level
Area of
panchayat

Panchayat
population

Literacy
rate

Panchayat
sex ratio

SC
percentage

ST
percentage

Poverty
level

Area of
panchayat

1.0000

0.0256*

1.0000

0.0116

0.0588*

1.0000

0.0165

-0.1080*

-0.1325*

1.0000

-0.0025

0.0382*

0.2294*

-0.3397*

1.0000

-0.0050

-0.1169*

-0.5296*

0.4393*

-0.5693*

1.0000

0.0025

-0.0920*

-0.0595*

-0.0399*

0.0193*

-0.0215*

1.0000

0.0230*

0.4567*

-0.1154*

-0.0801*

-0.0390*

0.0990*

0.0252*

1.000

(* indicates significance at 5% level)

Specifically, we use TM revenues and its square as instruments. First, we verify (Table
V-I) that these instruments are indeed correlated with the suspected endogenous variables.
Table V-I: Correlation between instruments and suspected endogenous variables
Rev

pancap *
rev

Revenue from
tanks & minerals

Rev

1.0000

pancap*rev

0.2649*

1.0000

Revenue from tanks &
minerals

0.1384*

0.6336*

1.0000

Revenue from tanks &
minerals squared

0.1088*

0.5104*

0.8295*

Revenue from tanks
& minerals squared

1.0000

(* indicates significance at 0.1% level)
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We conduct an instrumental variables regression74, and test for endogeneity. Results
show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity. In this case, our
ordinary least square estimate is consistent and is more efficient.
One possible reason why we do not find endogeneity in our variables of interest is that
innate ability factors that could appear linearly in the regression equation within the vector of
variables

(but are not included therein), also have an effect on the collection of own-source

revenues of the panchayat. This variable (OR) does appear as a part of the variable TR in the
regression equation. In any case, the natural experiment has enabled us to verify the absence
of endogeneity in our empirical regression model. Following the discussion about the
marginal and average effects in specification 1, we could think of another proxy for
panchayat capacity as TMR/TR in which case the regression equation becomes:

(0.11)

Here we use the per capita tank and mineral revenues as an explanatory variable to isolate
possible effect of hidden ability factors and to assess the marginal impact of decentralization.
The regressions are presented in Table V-J. Notably, the coefficient on TMR is positive and
significant. The increase in revenues from tank and minerals is expected to have a positive
impact on female enrollment ratios. This confirms the empirical result obtained earlier that
we can expect better outcomes when fiscal decentralization is effected through assignment of
taxes to panchayats, as compared to those that obtain through transfer grants.

74 ivreg2 in STATA with endogenity testing option yields a χ2 value for the statistic of 0.271, and a p-value of
0.8732.
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Table V-J: OLS Regression: Specification 2: (equation 0.11)
Female enrollment ratio
(2)
(3)
4.37e-05***
4.38e-05***
(3.05e-06)
(3.05e-06)

Total Revenue per capita

(1)
4.47e-05***
(3.02e-06)

Tank and mineral revenue
(TMR) per capita

7.99e-05*
(4.59e-05)

8.43e-05*
(4.62e-05)

8.41e-05*
(4.63e-05)

Panchayat sex ratio

-7.53e-06
(1.91e-05)

-4.30e-05**
(1.94e-05)

-4.28e-05**
(1.94e-05)

Literacy rate

0.163***
(0.0377)

0.264***
(0.0390)

0.265***
(0.0391)

Literacy rate (square)

-0.274***
(0.0411)

-0.330***
(0.0415)

-0.331***
(0.0415)

Poverty level

0.0569***
(0.0219)

0.0709***
(0.0219)

0.0705***
(0.0219)

Poverty level (square)

-0.0385**
(0.0185)

-0.0488***
(0.0185)

-0.0484***
(0.0185)

Expenditure on primary
schools, per capita

3.18e-07
(9.35e-07)

SC percent

-0.0102
(0.00899)

-0.0101
(0.00899)

ST percent

0.0510***
(0.00551)

0.0509***
(0.00552)

Sarpanch SC

-0.000551
(0.00247)

-0.000517
(0.00247)

Sarpanch ST

-0.00423*
(0.00250)

-0.00423*
(0.00250)

Sarpanch Sex

0.000117
(0.00183)

9.30e-05
(0.00183)

Total area of panchayat

-2.51e-05***
(1.89e-06)

-2.75e-05***
(1.91e-06)

-2.75e-05***
(1.91e-06)

Constant

0.181***
(0.0215)

0.168***
(0.0215)

0.167***
(0.0215)

Observations

11687

11680

11680

R-squared

0.262

0.270

0.270

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; district fixed effects and distance travelled
to fetch water suppressed.
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5.8 Accounting for differences in panchayat capacity
As discussed earlier, there may be institutional factors involved in determining the level
of per capita revenues currently being collected by the panchayat, and the impact indicated by
the empirical regression coefficients in the model above may not be accurate if we use these
to assess the impact of additional (marginal) tax-revenues that may be made available to a
panchayat. In other words, the marginal effect of an increase in per capita panchayat revenues
may be different from the average effect. This is in line with the finding of de Mello and
Barenstein (2001) wherein the ‘turning point’ occurs when the ratio of sub national
government spending to government spending is around 19%. That is, sub national revenue
mobilization exerts a positive influence on governance in economies where sub national
governments account for up to 19% of government spending.
However, in all our previous regressions, the marginal impact of increase in revenues is
positive. This may also be so because the total panchayat revenues are a very small fraction
of the total revenues of the state government, and therefore the ‘turning point’ obtained in the
de Mello and Barenstein study is not arrived at.
In general, panchayat capacity may be written as a function of revenues accrued from
various sources:
C = h (R1, R2, R3...)
After linearizing the above equation, and assuming two sources of panchayat’s own
revenues, the variable C can be replaced by R1 + α3 R2 in equation (0.8) above, and the
empirical equation can now be written as:

(0.12)
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We take ratio of own source revenues (other than tank and mineral revenues) to total
revenue as pancap1. Ratio of panchayat revenues from tank and mineral to total panchayat
revenues is taken as a measure of pancap2. Thus, pancap2 will proxy panchayat capacity
when taxes are assigned to panchayats ‘randomly’. It would also proxy for the marginal
effect of increase in own-revenues.
It will be interesting to see the empirical value and sign of
a negative value of

: a positive value for

and

would indicate a reduction in panchayat capacity if additional taxes are

assigned to panchayats at random. If both these coefficients are positive, but β3 is more than
β4, it would imply that additional taxes increase panchayat capacity, but the marginal effect is
less than the average effect.
We can now write:
Lemma 4: If

>0 then, on the margins, fiscal decentralization through assignment of

taxes is more effective than through transfer grants.
As before, it can be shown that if panchayat revenues increase by Rupee 1 through
greater assignment of taxes, value of the outcome variable increases by β 2+β4. If panchayat
revenues increase by Rupee 1 through transfer grants, the value of outcome variable increases
by β2.
We have deconstructed panchayat revenue from own sources into two categories: a.
panchayat revenue from tanks and minerals and b. panchayat revenue from all other own
sources. The unobservable ‘ability’ factors that might be influencing our revenue and
outcome indicators will be then confined to panchayat revenue from all other sources.
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As indicated earlier, the correlation check between the revenue raised from tank and
mineral sources and social indicators like enrollment ratios, poverty level of panchayat,
literacy rates shows that there is no significant correlation (Table V-H).
We now test our model including these disaggregated sources of own revenues (Table VK).
It is interesting to note that the coefficients of TMR and own revenues-net-of-TMR
appear to be quite similar. TMR and OR may behave similarly, since OR contains TMR. But
is TMR and OR-net-of-TMR also behaving similarly? We test this using equation 0.12 (more
specifically, regression (3) of Table V-K) and check whether the coefficient of TMR (β4) is
statistically same as the coefficient of OR-net-of-TMR (β3). The t-value of the test for β3 – β4
= 0 is 0.06, therefore, we cannot reject the null that these coefficients are equal. We can
interpret this result as implying that the marginal impact of increase in revenues (as proxied
by TMR) is similar to the average impact of increase in revenues (as proxied by OR-net-ofTMR).
We may also infer that ‘windfall’ resources made available to panchayats have a
significant influence on social outcomes like female enrollment ratios. This strengthens the
case for fiscal decentralization as this natural experiment demonstrates that allocation of
greater resources to panchayats results in improved social outcomes.
For an ‘average’ panchayat, if assignment of taxes increases per capita panchayat
revenues by one rupee, then its marginal impact on the female enrollment ratio equals β2 + β4
= 0.0001228. If transfer grants increases per capita panchayat revenue by one rupee, its
marginal impact on female enrollment ratio equals β2 = 0.0000424. Therefore, it can be
argued that insofar as we are concerned with improving female enrollment ratios the
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empirical results suggest that assignment of taxes is about three times as effective as simple
transfer grants. This is consistent with the results obtained earlier.
Further, the coefficient β4, that measures impact of marginal assignment of taxes is less
than, but close to the coefficient β3 that measures the average impact of own revenues.
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Table V-K: OLS Regression: Specification 2- Accounting for differences in capacity

Total Revenue per capita

(1)
4.34e-05***
(3.08e-06)

Female enrollment ratio
(2)
(3)
4.23e-05***
4.24e-05***
(3.11e-06)
(3.11e-06)

Own Revenue (OR) net of TMR

7.93e-05**
(3.43e-05)

8.36e-05**
(3.45e-05)

8.39e-05**
(3.45e-05)

Tank and mineral revenue
(TMR) per capita

7.64e-05*
(4.63e-05)

8.07e-05*
(4.65e-05)

8.04e-05*
(4.66e-05)

Panchayat sex ratio

-7.84e-06
(1.91e-05)

-4.34e-05**
(1.94e-05)

-4.32e-05**
(1.94e-05)

Literacy rate

0.163***
(0.0376)

0.264***
(0.0389)

0.266***
(0.0390)

Literacy rate (square)

-0.275***
(0.0410)

-0.331***
(0.0414)

-0.332***
(0.0414)

Poverty level

0.0572***
(0.0219)

0.0713***
(0.0218)

0.0709***
(0.0218)

Poverty level (square)

-0.0387**
(0.0185)

-0.0490***
(0.0185)

-0.0486***
(0.0185)

Expenditure on primary schools,
per capita

3.26e-07
(9.33e-07)

SC percent

-0.0103
(0.00899)

-0.0102
(0.00899)

ST percent

0.0511***
(0.00551)

0.0510***
(0.00551)

Sarpanch SC

-0.000615
(0.00247)

-0.000578
(0.00247)

Sarpanch ST

-0.00427*
(0.00250)

-0.00426*
(0.00250)

Sarpanch Sex

0.000118
(0.00183)

9.23e-05
(0.00183)

Total area of panchayat

-2.50e-05***
(1.89e-06)

-2.74e-05***
(1.91e-06)

-2.74e-05***
(1.91e-06)

Constant

0.182***
(0.0215)

0.168***
(0.0215)

0.167***
(0.0215)

Observations

11687

11680

11680

R-squared

0.262

0.270

0.270

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; district fixed effects suppressed;
water distance results suppressed.
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5.9 Male enrollment ratio
The village data collected by the 3rd SFC has thrown up interesting and important results
on the impact of fiscal decentralization on female enrollment ratio in rural areas. We have
seen above that our empirical results suggest that assignment of taxes is more effective (three
times as much) than simple transfer grants on improving female enrollment ratios (FER) in
elementary schools.
The next question that follows is that do male enrollment ratios (MER) also get similarly
positively impacted by assignment of tax-base to panchayats?
Let us recall here that while female literacy in Madhya Pradesh is below the all-India
average, the male literacy rate in Madhya Pradesh is marginally higher than the all-India rate
(Table III-J, Chapter 4).
We run the empirical tests with male enrollment ratio as the dependent variable. The
results are presented in Appendix C. The results we get are somewhat different from the
results above for female enrollment ratios. First, the two-sample t-test (wherein we check
whether the MER is significantly different between the group of panchayats which has
revenues from tank and minerals and the group which does not), reveals that though MER is
higher for the have-panchayats, it is not significantly so.
In our first empirical model (specification 1: equation 0.3, Table C2, Appendix C), OLS
results for MER are similar to those for FER. The coefficients of total revenue, ratio of own
source revenue to total revenue, literacy rate, poverty level, ST population are all positive and
significant.
The regressions of the second model, equation 0.4 are presented in Table C3, Appendix
C. As earlier, in this regression, we try and isolate ability factors by segregating revenues
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from tanks and minerals (TMR) which have accrued as a windfall randomly to panchayats.
Again, the coefficients of total revenue remain positive, but the coefficient on the dummy for
TMR, as well as the coefficient for the dummy on TMR/TR>20% are not significant. These
results indicate that marginal increases in panchayat revenues do not matter that much in the
decision on sending the male child to school. This may be so perhaps, since male children
already have higher enrollment ratios than female children, all throughout the state.
Let us see now, how the second specification (equation 0.10), where we use the ratio of
own-source revenue to total revenue as a proxy for institutional capacity of the panchayat,
impacts MER. The regression results (Table C5, Appendix C) show that for MER, as
compared to FER, own revenues per capita have a lower coefficient and are significant at
lower levels. Panchayat sex ratio (an important indicator for gender equality) is not
significant for MER: irrespective of the status of women in the village, male children go to
school. The results of separating ability factors from the measure of institutional capacity and
testing of impact on MER are presented in Table C7, Appendix C). Again our results confirm
that greater resource availability with panchayats impacts MER positively, though the impact
is lesser than that on FER.
In most parts of India, the status of the girl child in primary education is lower than that
of the male child. There are many contributing factors, well documented in economic and
education literature (For example, Mehrotra, 2010). Since boys do not face the historical
disadvantages, and socio-cultural factors which inhibit girls’ enrollment in schools, the
impact of the actions taken by the panchayats on male enrollment ratios is expected to be
lower at the margin.
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5.10 The source of revenue matters
We have demonstrated above that performance of local governments depends not only
on the gross resources available for financing the provision of public goods, but also on the
sources from which these revenues are financed. Greater own source revenues result in better
outcomes. Our findings are in line with Barankay and Lockwood (2006), who use data from
Swiss cantons to demonstrate a narrowing of the gender gap in education and conclude that
more fiscal decentralization is associated with higher educational attainment75. Our empirical
results for Madhya Pradesh are likely to be valid for most major states in India.

75 Of course, in the Swiss case, the gender gap is reversed. The objective of public policy in Switzerland is to
bring the male educational attainment in line with female educational attainment indices, which are better.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion

In India, the state of Madhya Pradesh took an early initiative towards democratic
decentralization by establishing institutions of local self-government at the village, block and
district level in rural areas and in urban areas. However, this political decentralization was not
accompanied with commensurate fiscal and administrative decentralization. There has
remained a perceived reluctance on the part of the state government to transfer taxation rights
to the three-tier panchayats. It is often held that panchayats do not have the capacity to raise
resources and to deliver public goods effectively and efficiently.
This paper has used data collected from villages and demonstrated that performance of
local governments (panchayats) depends not only on the total resources available for
providing public goods, but also on the sources from which these revenues are financed. In
chapter 4, we examined the pattern of expenditures of panchayats to see if there were any
differences which could be observed between panchayats which have different sources for
financing of their outlays. We hypothesized that attendance in panchayats would increase as
own-source revenues increased, and affirmative action would enable marginalized
communities to participate more in the decision-making process in these local governments.
As marginalized castes and communities gained confidence to attend panchayat meetings and
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exercise their vote options with every successive round of elections, the choices made by the
panchayat could be expected to reflect the true choices of the entire community.
We found that panchayats with higher proportion of own-source revenues spent a larger
fraction of their total outlays on drinking water and street lights.
In chapter 5 we observed that panchayats with larger own source revenues had better
female and male enrollment ratios in schools. We also checked for potential hidden ability
factors and demonstrated that panchayats with access to revenues from unexpected ‘windfall’
tank and mineral revenues also achieve better social outcomes. We therefore concluded that
empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a higher proportion of own source revenues
results in better outcomes.
The debate on decentralization in India has focused on transfer of function, funds, and
functionaries (3Fs) to panchayats. While many have argued that assignment of taxation
powers is also an important component of decentralization; yet, the actual assignment to
panchayats has not taken place in a significant manner. The demand for creating their
resource base gets drowned in the din about their lack of capacity, experience, etc. In such a
scenario, evidence that whatever experiments have taken place, have resulted in positive, and
quantifiable outcomes (or otherwise) will strengthen (or weaken) the argument for greater
assignment of resources to local self-governments.
Of course, this research is based on data for two years, from one state. As state
governments put in place better data collection systems, and more research is conducted into
expenditure patterns of panchayats it would better inform on what works and what doesn’t,
and shall help the policy-maker in design of better policies.
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What policy implications can we derive from this analysis? The Indian Government is
pursuing the goal of poverty reduction and inclusive economic growth. Political
decentralization, accompanied by affirmative action has been accepted as an important tool to
deepen democracy and improve delivery of public services. The contention that fiscal
decentralization must accompany political decentralization assumes greater weight when it
can be demonstrated, using evidence based analysis from real data, that there has been an
improvement in delivery of public services, and social outcomes, indeed, an improvement in
governance, wherever there has been fiscal decentralization. In a scenario where, due to
limited availability of data, there are very few village and panchayat level studies, our study
assumes significance in making a proposal backed by evidence, that we also need to
decentralize fiscal powers alongside with political powers to local self-governments for
better results.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Devolution Index
Table A-1: Evaluation of States for devolution index for 2008-09
Rank

States

Score of
functions

Score of
finances

Score of
functionaries

Overall
Score

1

Madhya Pradesh

4.52

4.08

4.71

4.44

2

West Bengal

5.00

3.68

4.43

4.37

3

Tamil Nadu

5.00

3.62

4.29

4.30

4

Kerala

5.00

2.82

4.29

4.04

5

Karnataka

5.00

3.29

3.64

3.98

6

Sikkim

5.00

3.20

3.29

3.83

7

Himachal Pradesh

3.83

2.97

4.14

3.65

8

Haryana

4.45

2.53

3.29

3.42

9

Chhattisgarh

4.31

2.89

2.86

3.35

10

Assam

4.60

2.47

2.64

3.24

11

Andhra Pradesh

3.72

3.29

2.14

3.05

12

Uttar Pradesh

3.83

3.01

2.00

2.95

13

Maharashtra

2.52

2.69

3.57

2.93

14

Arunachal Pradesh

5.00

1.53

1.93

2.82

15

Rajasthan

3.30

2.80

2.00

2.70

16

Goa

3.42

3.34

1.29

2.68

17

Tripura

3.86

0.93

2.21

2.34

18

Orissa

2.69

1.92

2.29

2.30

19

Bihar

3.60

0.73

2.43

2.25

20

Punjab

1.10

1.51

2.21

1.61

21

Manipur

0.54

2.20

1.64

1.46

Average

3.82

2.64

2.92

3.13

Source: Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India
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Table A-2: Indicators for Devolution Index Survey 2008-09

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Functions
De facto
transfer of 29
functions listed
in 11th
Schedule.
Detailed
Activity
Mapping
conducted for
these 29
functions.
Whether DPC
is involved in
the
preparation of
District Plan?
Are GP
implementing
the major
Flagship
Programmes?
Are GP fully
empowered
to prepare
plans for
expenditure?

6.
7.
8.
9.

10.

11.

12.

13.
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.

Finances
Authorization of PRIs to
collect taxes, duties, tolls etc.
PRIs own revenue as % of
PRIs expenditure.
Timely action on latest SFC's
major recommendations.
Percentage of funds
devolved to PRIs that are
untied (Plan).
Percentage of funds
devolved to PRIs that are
untied (Non-plan).
Promptness with which
Twelfth Finance Commission
Funds transferred to PRIs.
Allocation of funds to PRIs
based on apportionment
formula.
Are GP fully empowered to
sanction expenditure?
Whether there is a separate
budget line for PRIs in the
State Budget for 2007-08?
Devolution of finances
corresponds to functions?
Percentage of PRIs whose
accounts are audited (GP).
Percentage of PRIs whose
accounts are audited (BP).
Percentage of PRIs whose
accounts are audited (DP).
Specify the registers in which
the accounts of GP are
updated.
Do any funds directly go to
the GP with respect to the
functions?

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

Functionaries
Expert Institutions and entities
to support PRIs for the
preparation of their Annual
Plans specified.
Expert institutions and entities
to support capacity building/
training of elected officials of
PRIs specified.
Amount of money provided
for the capacity building/
training of elected officials of
PRIs.
Amount of money provided
for the capacity
building/training of appointed
officials of PRIs.
Annual Report for last fiscal
year released.
Functionary wise
accountability to PRIs: GP.
Functionary wise
accountability to PRIs: IP.
Functionary wise
accountability to PRIs: DP.
Average days of training of
Functionaries: Elected
Officials; GP
Average days of training of
Functionaries: Appointed
Officials; GP
Average days of training of
Functionaries: Elected
Officials; IP
Average days of training of
Functionaries: Appointed
Officials; IP
Average days of training of
Functionaries: Elected
Officials; DP
Average days of training of
Functionaries: Appointed
Officials; DP

Source: Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India
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Appendix B: Comparative Expenditure Patterns
Note: For all the tables in this Appendix, group 0 consists of all panchayats that
have revenues from tanks and minerals. Group 1 consists of panchayats that do not
have revenues from these sources.

Table B-1: t test for percentage expenditure on water
Two-sample t test with equal variances
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Group |
Obs
Mean
Std. Err.
Std. Dev.
[95% Conf. Interval]
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------0 |
6142
.1673132
.0032517
.2548386
.1609387
.1736877
1 |
1137
.1992355
.0078687
.2653273
.1837967
.2146743
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------combined |
7279
.1722996
.0030093
.2567484
.1664004
.1781987
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------diff |
-.0319223
.0082812
-.0481559
-.0156887
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------diff = mean(0) - mean(1)
t = -3.8548
Ho: diff = 0
degrees of freedom =
7277
Ha: diff < 0

Ha: diff != 0

Ha: diff > 0

Table B-2: t test for percentage expenditure on sanitation
Two-sample t test with equal variances
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Group |
Obs
Mean
Std. Err.
Std. Dev.
[95% Conf. Interval]
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------0 |
6142
.0309028
.0014299
.112063
.0280997
.033706
1 |
1137
.0376256
.0031534
.1063303
.0314385
.0438127
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------combined |
7279
.0319529
.0013035
.1112067
.0293978
.0345081
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------diff |
-.0067227
.0035897
-.0137596
.0003141
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------diff = mean(0) - mean(1)
t = -1.8728
Ho: diff = 0
degrees of freedom =
7277
Ha: diff < 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0306

Ha: diff != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0611

Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T > t) = 0.9694
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Table B-3: t test for percentage expenditure on internal roads and drains
Two-sample t test with equal variances
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Group |
Obs
Mean
Std. Err.
Std. Dev.
[95% Conf. Interval]
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------0 |
6142
.0909127
.0025282
.1981362
.0859566
.0958689
1 |
1137
.0925018
.0054457
.1836256
.081817
.1031865
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------combined |
7279
.0911609
.0022965
.1959292
.0866592
.0956627
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------diff |
-.001589
.006326
-.0139898
.0108117
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------diff = mean(0) - mean(1)
t = -0.2512
Ho: diff = 0
degrees of freedom =
7277
Ha: diff < 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.4008

Ha: diff != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8017

Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T > t) = 0.5992

Table B-4: t test for percentage expenditure on roads and bridges
Two-sample t test with equal variances
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Group |
Obs
Mean
Std. Err.
Std. Dev.
[95% Conf. Interval]
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------0 |
6142
.2257868
.0040382
.3164735
.2178706
.233703
1 |
1137
.2477356
.0092164
.3107712
.2296526
.2658187
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------combined |
7279
.2292152
.0037
.3156691
.2219623
.2364682
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------diff |
-.0219488
.0101888
-.0419219
-.0019758
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------diff = mean(0) - mean(1)
t = -2.1542
Ho: diff = 0
degrees of freedom =
7277
Ha: diff < 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0156

Ha: diff != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0313

Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T > t) = 0.9844
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Table B-5: t test for percentage expenditure on street lights
Two-sample t test with equal variances
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Group |
Obs
Mean
Std. Err.
Std. Dev.
[95% Conf. Interval]
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------0 |
6142
.0194974
.0010421
.0816738
.0174544
.0215403
1 |
1137
.0260249
.0027435
.0925077
.0206421
.0314077
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------combined |
7279
.020517
.0009785
.0834857
.0185988
.0224352
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------diff |
-.0065275
.0026944
-.0118094
-.0012457
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------diff = mean(0) - mean(1)
t = -2.4226
Ho: diff = 0
degrees of freedom =
7277
Ha: diff < 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0077

Ha: diff != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0154

Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T > t) = 0.9923

Table B-6: t test for percentage expenditure on primary schools
Two-sample t test with equal variances
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Group |
Obs
Mean
Std. Err.
Std. Dev.
[95% Conf. Interval]
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------0 |
6142
.133781
.0033575
.2631325
.127199
.1403629
1 |
1137
.1321376
.0075501
.2545848
.1173239
.1469513
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------combined |
7279
.1335243
.0030685
.2617992
.127509
.1395395
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------diff |
.0016434
.0084527
-.0149264
.0182132
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------diff = mean(0) - mean(1)
t =
0.1944
Ho: diff = 0
degrees of freedom =
7277
Ha: diff < 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.5771

Ha: diff != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8458

Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T > t) = 0.4229
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Table B-7: t test for percentage expenditure on other items
Two-sample t test with equal variances
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Group |
Obs
Mean
Std. Err.
Std. Dev.
[95% Conf. Interval]
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------0 |
6142
.3318061
.0050599
.3965501
.3218869
.3417253
1 |
1137
.2647391
.010443
.3521317
.2442494
.2852288
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------combined |
7279
.3213301
.0045792
.3906822
.3123535
.3303066
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------diff |
.067067
.0125895
.0423879
.0917461
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------diff = mean(0) - mean(1)
t =
5.3272
Ho: diff = 0
degrees of freedom =
7277
Ha: diff < 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000

Ha: diff != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000

Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
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Appendix C: Male Enrollment Ratio – Regression Results
Table C-1: Two-sample t test with equal variances (male enrollment ratio)
Group
Obs
Mean
Std. Err.
Std. Dev.
[95% Conf.
Interval]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------0
8831 .2406528
.0011812
.1110038
.2383374
.2429683
1
1749 .2419918
.0025221
.1054774
.2370451
.2469385
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------combined
10580 .2408742
.0010705
.1101056
.2387759
.2429725
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------diff
-.001339
.0028818
-.0069879
.00431
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------diff = mean( 0) - mean( 1)
t = -0.4646
Ho: diff = 0
Ha: diff < 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.3211

Ha: diff != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.6422

degrees of freedom = 10578
Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T > t) = 0.6789

Note: Group 0 consists of all panchayats that have revenues from tanks and
minerals. Group 1 consists of panchayats that do not have revenues from these
sources.
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Table C-2: OLS Regression: Specification 1 (equation 0.3)
Male enrollment ratio
(1)
3.89e-05***
(3.45e-06)

(2)
3.75e-05***
(3.49e-06)

(3)
3.77e-05***
(3.50e-06)

Own Source Revenue /TR

0.0251
(0.0159)

0.0312**
(0.0159)

0.0311*
(0.0159)

Panchayat sex ratio

3.39e-05
(2.19e-05)

-1.59e-05
(2.21e-05)

-1.52e-05
(2.21e-05)

Literacy Rate

0.112***
(0.0426)

0.259***
(0.0436)

0.262***
(0.0437)

Literacy rate (square)

-0.264***
(0.0464)

-0.352***
(0.0464)

-0.355***
(0.0464)

Poverty level

0.119***
(0.0262)

0.138***
(0.0260)

0.137***
(0.0260)

Poverty level (square)

-0.0887***
(0.0219)

-0.102***
(0.0217)

-0.101***
(0.0217)

Total Revenue (TR) per capita

Expenditure on primary school
(per capita)

1.57e-06**
(6.37e-07)

SC percent

-0.0102
(0.0103)

-0.0100
(0.0103)

ST percent

0.0692***
(0.00614)

0.0691***
(0.00613)

Sarpanch SC

-0.00184
(0.00286)

-0.00186
(0.00285)

Sarpanch ST

-0.00186
(0.00294)

-0.00193
(0.00294)

Sarpanch Sex

-0.00260
(0.00211)

-0.00258
(0.00211)

Distance travelled to fetch water
(201m to 500m)

-0.00241
(0.00344)

Distance travelled to fetch water
(501m to 1000m)

-0.00112
(0.00317)

Distance travelled to fetch water
(1001m to 2000m)

0.0110**
(0.00461)

Distance travelled to fetch water
(above 2001m)

-0.00207
(0.00289)
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Male enrollment ratio
(1)
-2.22e-05***
(2.35e-06)

(2)
-2.55e-05***
(2.36e-06)

(3)
-2.54e-05***
(2.36e-06)

Constant

0.188***
(0.0245)

0.169***
(0.0246)

0.168***
(0.0246)

Observations

10,580

10,575

10,575

R-squared

0.251

0.263

0.264

Total area of panchayat

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; district fixed effects suppressed.
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Table C-3: OLS Regression: Specification 1 (Equation 0.4)
Male enrollment ratio
Total Revenue (TR) per capita

(1)
3.74e-05***
(3.49e-06)

Tank and mineral revenue
(TMR)/TR

0.00929
(0.0357)

(2)
3.78e-05***
(3.50e-06)

(3)
3.75e-05***
(8.27e-06)

Dummy_TMR [0,1]

-0.00267
(0.00273)

Dummy_TMR/TR> 20% [0,1]

0.00261
(0.0150)

0.00259
(0.0146)

Panchayat sex ratio

-1.60e-05
(2.21e-05)

-1.50e-05
(2.21e-05)

1.53e-05
(5.57e-05)

Literacy Rate

0.258***
(0.0436)

0.261***
(0.0436)

0.323***
(0.121)

Literacy rate (square)

-0.351***
(0.0464)

-0.354***
(0.0464)

-0.405***
(0.129)

Poverty level

0.138***
(0.0260)

0.137***
(0.0260)

0.179***
(0.0581)

Poverty level (square)

-0.102***
(0.0217)

-0.101***
(0.0217)

-0.149***
(0.0510)

1.59e-06**
(6.25e-07)

1.07e-06***
(3.99e-07)

Expenditure on primary school
(per capita)
SC percent

-0.0103
(0.0103)

-0.0101
(0.0103)

-0.0136
(0.0258)

ST percent

0.0689***
(0.00614)

0.0686***
(0.00614)

0.0725***
(0.0161)

Sarpanch SC

-0.00183
(0.00286)

-0.00182
(0.00286)

0.00884
(0.00708)

Sarpanch ST

-0.00189
(0.00294)

-0.00195
(0.00294)

0.00380
(0.00668)

Sarpanch Sex

-0.00263
(0.00211)

-0.00260
(0.00211)

-0.00218
(0.00514)

Total area of panchayat

-2.55e-05***
(2.36e-06)

-2.54e-05***
(2.35e-06)

-3.02e-05***
(7.02e-06)
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Male enrollment ratio
Constant

(1)
0.170***
(0.0245)

(2)
0.170***
(0.0246)

(3)
0.121*
(0.0655)

Observations

10,575

10,575

1,749

R-squared

0.263

0.263

0.249

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; district fixed effects and distance
travelled for water results suppressed.
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Table C-4: OLS Regression: Specification 1 (Equation 0.5)
Male enrollment Ratio
Total Revenue (TR) per
capita

(1)
3.77e-05***
(3.49e-06)

(2)
3.80e-05***
(3.50e-06)

(3)
3.76e-05***
(8.26e-06)

Own Revenue minus tank
-mineral revenue /TR

0.0384**
(0.0180)

0.0397**
(0.0180)

0.0220
(0.0395)

Tank and mineral revenue
(TMR)/TR

0.00797
(0.0357)

Dummy_TMR [0,1]

-0.00299
(0.00271)

Dummy_TMR/TR> 20%
[0,1]

0.00293
(0.0146)

Panchayat sex ratio

-1.60e-05
(2.21e-05)

-1.49e-05
(2.21e-05)

1.55e-05
(5.57e-05)

Literacy Rate

0.260***
(0.0436)

0.263***
(0.0437)

0.325***
(0.121)

Literacy rate (square)

-0.353***
(0.0464)

-0.356***
(0.0465)

-0.407***
(0.129)

Poverty level

0.138***
(0.0260)

0.137***
(0.0260)

0.179***
(0.0581)

Poverty level (square)

-0.102***
(0.0217)

-0.101***
(0.0217)

-0.149***
(0.0510)

1.60e-06**
(6.25e-07)

1.07e-06***
(4.00e-07)

Expenditure on primary
school (per capita)
SC percent

-0.0101
(0.0103)

-0.00998
(0.0103)

-0.0134
(0.0257)

ST percent

0.0692***
(0.00614)

0.0689***
(0.00614)

0.0727***
(0.0162)

Sarpanch SC

-0.00183
(0.00286)

-0.00182
(0.00286)

0.00895
(0.00707)

Sarpanch ST

-0.00185
(0.00294)

-0.00191
(0.00293)

0.00398
(0.00667)

Sarpanch Sex

-0.00260
(0.00211)

-0.00257
(0.00211)

-0.00215
(0.00514)

Total area of panchayat

-2.55e-05***
(2.36e-06)

-2.54e-05***
(2.35e-06)

-3.02e-05***
(7.03e-06)
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Male enrollment Ratio
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
0.169***
(0.0246)
10,575
0.263

(2)
0.168***
(0.0246)

(3)
0.119*
(0.0656)

10,575

1,749

0.264

0.249

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; district fixed effects and distance
travelled for water results suppressed.
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Table C-5: OLS Regression: Specification 2 (equation 0.10)
Male enrollment ratio
Total Revenue (TR) per
capita
Own Source revenue per
capita
Panchayat sex ratio
Literacy Rate
Literacy rate (square)
Poverty level
Poverty level (square)

(1)
3.74e-05***
(3.55e-06)
5.79e-05*
(3.47e-05)
3.36e-05
(2.19e-05)
0.112***
(0.0426)
-0.264***
(0.0464)
0.119***
(0.0262)
-0.0887***
(0.0219)

(2)
3.58e-05***
(3.59e-06)
6.62e-05*
(3.47e-05)
-1.63e-05
(2.21e-05)
0.259***
(0.0436)
-0.352***
(0.0464)
0.138***
(0.0260)
-0.102***
(0.0218)

-2.22e-05***
(2.35e-06)
0.189***
(0.0245)
10,580

-0.0103
(0.0103)
0.0691***
(0.00614)
-0.00188
(0.00286)
-0.00189
(0.00294)
-0.00261
(0.00211)
-2.54e-05***
(2.36e-06)
0.170***
(0.0246)
10,575

Expenditure on primary
school (per capita)
SC percent
ST percent
Sarpanch SC
Sarpanch ST
Sarpanch Sex
Total area of panchayat
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.251

0.263

(3)
3.60e-05***
(3.60e-06)
6.71e-05*
(3.47e-05)
-1.56e-05
(2.21e-05)
0.261***
(0.0437)
-0.354***
(0.0464)
0.137***
(0.0260)
-0.101***
(0.0217)
1.57e-06**
(6.39e-07)
-0.0102
(0.0103)
0.0690***
(0.00613)
-0.00191
(0.00286)
-0.00195
(0.00294)
-0.00258
(0.00211)
-2.54e-05***
(2.35e-06)
0.169***
(0.0246)
10,575
0.264

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; district fixed effects and distance
travelled for water results suppressed.
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Table C-6: OLS Regression: Specification 2 - Testing for hidden ability factors (Eq 0.11)
Male enrollment ratio
(2)
3.72e-05***
(3.51e-06)

Total Revenue (TR) per capita

(1)
3.87e-05***
(3.47e-06)

Tank and mineral revenue
(TMR) per capita

1.74e-05
(6.98e-05)

2.87e-05
(6.81e-05)

3.00e-05
(6.83e-05)

Panchayat sex ratio

3.37e-05
(2.19e-05)

-1.61e-05
(2.21e-05)

-1.54e-05
(2.21e-05)

Literacy Rate

0.112***
(0.0426)

0.258***
(0.0436)

0.261***
(0.0437)

Literacy rate (square)

-0.263***
(0.0464)

-0.351***
(0.0464)

-0.354***
(0.0464)

Poverty level

0.119***
(0.0261)

0.138***
(0.0260)

0.137***
(0.0260)

Poverty level (square)

-0.0887***
(0.0219)

-0.102***
(0.0217)

-0.101***
(0.0217)

Expenditure on primary school
(per capita)

(3)
3.74e-05***
(3.52e-06)

1.57e-06**
(6.37e-07)

SC percent

-0.0103
(0.0103)

-0.0101
(0.0103)

ST percent

0.0689***
(0.00614)

0.0688***
(0.00614)

Sarpanch SC

-0.00184
(0.00286)

-0.00187
(0.00286)

Sarpanch ST

-0.00190
(0.00294)

-0.00196
(0.00294)

Sarpanch Sex

-0.00263
(0.00211)

-0.00260
(0.00211)

Total area of panchayat

-2.23e-05***
(2.35e-06)

-2.55e-05***
(2.36e-06)

-2.54e-05***
(2.35e-06)

Constant

0.189***
(0.0245)

0.170***
(0.0246)

0.169***
(0.0246)

Observations

10,580

10,575

10,575

R-squared

0.251

0.263

0.263

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; district fixed effects and distance
travelled for water results suppressed.
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Table C-7: OLS Regression, Specification 2: Accounting for differences in capacity

Total Revenue (TR) per capita
Own Revenue (OR) net of TMR
Tank and mineral revenue
(TMR) per capita
Panchayat sex ratio
Literacy Rate
Literacy rate (square)
Poverty level
Poverty level (square)
Expenditure on primary school
(per capita)
SC percent
ST percent
Sarpanch SC
Sarpanch ST
Sarpanch Sex
Total area of panchayat
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Male enrollment ratio
(1)
(2)
(3)
3.74e-05***
3.58e-05***
3.59e-05***
(3.55e-06)
(3.59e-06)
(3.60e-06)
8.46e-05**
9.09e-05**
9.16e-05**
(3.90e-05)
(4.00e-05)
(4.00e-05)
1.64e-05
2.77e-05
2.89e-05
(7.03e-05)
(6.86e-05)
(6.88e-05)
3.36e-05
-1.63e-05
-1.56e-05
(2.18e-05)
(2.21e-05)
(2.21e-05)
0.112***
0.259***
0.261***
(0.0426)
(0.0436)
(0.0437)
-0.264***
-0.352***
-0.355***
(0.0464)
(0.0464)
(0.0464)
0.119***
0.138***
0.137***
(0.0262)
(0.0260)
(0.0260)
-0.0885***
-0.102***
-0.101***
(0.0219)
(0.0217)
(0.0217)
1.57e-06**
(6.38e-07)
-0.0103
-0.0102
(0.0103)
(0.0103)
0.0690***
0.0690***
(0.00614)
(0.00613)
-0.00187
-0.00190
(0.00286)
(0.00286)
-0.00187
-0.00193
(0.00294)
(0.00294)
-0.00261
-0.00258
(0.00211)
(0.00211)
-2.22e-05***
-2.54e-05***
-2.54e-05***
(2.35e-06)
(2.36e-06)
(2.35e-06)
0.189***
0.170***
0.169***
(0.0245)
(0.0246)
(0.0246)
10,580
10,575
10,575
0.251

0.263

0.264

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; district fixed effects and distance
travelled for water results suppressed.
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